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Introduction

Discourse comprehension
The main aim of the following work is to investigate the concept of discourse (and also conversation analysis) in the linguistic perspective focusing on classroom discourse in, specifically, English as a second or foreign language setting.

In my work, I follow, inter alia, B. Johnstone (2008a: 21) who believes that discourse (in Latin: *discursus*) stands for any language forms – both verbal and non-verbal messages – articulated and interpreted during every communicative act. And every communicative act appears as a result of communicative goal. Having established what discourse is, it will be worth paying attention towards schematic structures of language.

These structures (such as, for instance, schema or script, strictly connected with the principle of analogy or local interpretation), H. G. Widdowson (2007: 26) claims, draw in their recipients' heads certain context. This context helps recipients understand language while discourse content – or, rather, its text both in the spoken and the written form – is processed (realized). Content and form, N. Fairclough (1995: 188) notices, cannot be examined separately since content is always realized in form and different contents activate different forms, and vice versa; they will be the subject of my study, too.

Then, I shall take up the concept of context (among other things: situational, general or interpersonal) in which discourse is articulated, spread and interpreted. The analysis of context will also be an appropriate place to raise the phenomenon of discourse thematisation – although, as G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 68) remind us, “it is speakers and writers who have topics, not texts”. Besides, topics or, rather, their idiosyncratic presentations are not always interpreted by their recipients in a correct manner, which can result in the problem of inherent disharmony.

According to R. T. Lakoff (1973), for social interaction to take place without any interference (that is one which is deprived of excessive friction or danger of communication process failure), interlocutors should apply to the following rules: formality (distance), hesitancy (deference), equality (camaraderie).

It is worth supplementing these initial remarks that relate to context with forms dependent on it such as deictic forms (deictic markers, presupposition, implicature, inference, deferred ostention, intertextuality and appropriateness), grammatical cohesive devices (reference, coreferential and coclassificational forms, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction) or lexical cohesive devices (synonyms, antonyms, meronyms, hyponyms).

In my work, I will also focus, following J. Blommaert (2007), on the processes of contextualisation and entextualisation (that is decontextualisation and metadiscursive recontextualisation) as well as ways in which discourse is shaped by context and how discourse shapes its own context. Indeed, as B. Johnstone (2008a: 10) claims:
• Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world.
• Discourse is shaped by language, and discourse shapes language.
• Discourse is shaped by participants, and discourse shapes participants.
• Discourse is shaped by prior discourse, and discourse shapes the possibilities for future discourse.
• Discourse is shaped by its medium, and discourse shapes the possibilities of its medium.
• Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes.

Discourse analysis
In the next part, I shall define discourse analysis, the area truly interdisciplinary or, as R. Scollon/ S. W. Scollon (2008: 538) call it “polysemic”. In my work I will follow E. Hatch’s point of view (2001: 1), according to which discourse analysis is the study of the language of communication – spoken or written that presents communication as “an interlocking social, cognitive, and linguistic enterprise.” Equally crucial is the comparison of discourse to language by D. Schiffrin/ D. Tannen/ H. E. Hamilton (2008: 3). G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 1), in turn, confirm the above statement to be true since, according to them, the analysis of discourse is “necessarily, the analysis of language in use”.

Critical discourse analysis
N. Fairclough (1995: 101) pays attention to the current trend of “discourse conversationalization” which diminishes asymmetry that exists in, for instance, teachers-students relations. As a consequence, then, it is important to examine multidisciplinary, critical discourse analysis as well as forms of verbal interaction where it is particularly worth mentioning: political discourse, discourse and racism, media language, medical discourse, genre, child discourse and male-female communication, computer-mediated discourse and, last but not least, focusing on discourse in education settings.

Conversation analysis
After the presentation of the disciplines of pedagogic knowledge, I shall move subsequently to conversation analysis (in American tradition, the very same scope of everyday oral interactions is subordinated to the general concept of discourse analysis), and speech acts and speech act theory.

In my considerations regarding the first, fourteen “grossly apparent” facts about any conversation by H. Sacks/ E. A. Schegloff/ G. Jefferson (1974) will be recalled, and particularly those referring to conversational turn-taking. I shall also probe: a) adjacency pairs (that is basic structural units comprised of two mutually dependent utterances used to open and close conversations and defined by H. Sacks 1974), b) phonology (with division into intonational and tone groups of languages), c) the cooperative principle and maxims (according to H. P. Grice’s cooperative principle communication is an intentional act, yet complemented by the maxim of quantity, quality, relation or relevance and manner); in relation to the above list, G. Leech’
politeness principle of 1983, and D. Sperber/ D. Wilson's principle of relevance of 1995 shall be tackled on alike, d) universal constraints and culture-specific conventions.

Speech acts and speech act theory
One needs to remember that in the process of cooperative interaction, we are able to articulate an indefinite number of sentences despite the fact that our lexico-grammatical set of rules is limited (N. Chomsky 1965, 1966). Each one of such utterances, apart from exchanging thoughts and ideas, might also perform social actions or functions – these actions are called performative by J. L. Austin (1962, 1976). They are generally referred to as speech acts: a point where, as R. Harré (2008: 696) puts it “social psychology and linguistic analysis intersect”.

J. L. Austin (1976) is the author of the four conditions which must be satisfied for any performative act not to misfire and be fully realized. These conditions assume that anything that someone says becomes effective only if it is said by the right person in the right circumstances, and if it is so understood by the other party involved. Speech act theory is a description of what certain utterances name (such as promise, apologise or threaten), and originates from J. L. Austin’s prior observations. He (1976) claims, namely, that while sentences can often be used to report states of affairs, the utterance of some sentences must, in some specified circumstances, be treated as the performance of an act (similarly to performative verbs). Looking at this thread in more detail, we are able to spot easily that each realization of any speech act has three dimensions: locutionary meaning (based on the meaning of the linguistic expression), illocutionary force (the intended meaning) and perlocutionary effect (the effect the act has on the addressee).

The following subsection, in turn, focuses on performative verbs that carry the lexical meaning of speech act – uttering such a verb constitutes a performance of some action. J. L. Austin (1976) proposes grouping performative verbs into five major classes: verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives.

Yet other issues to be focused on will be the five macro-classes of speech acts, and the role of speech acts in language teaching. Their influence is quite crucial indeed as shortly after J. L. Austin's (1976) and J. R. Searle's (1969) presentations the Council of Europe accepts new syllabuses introduced by J. A. Van Ek (1976) or D. A. Wilkins (1976).

Discourse and teaching and learning the English language
In my work, I am also going to refer to discourse and teaching-learning the English language. English teaching and learning contexts that are going to be analysed will include: B. B. Kachru’s sociolinguistic model of present-day Englishes (1985), R. Taylor's BANA (1996), A. Holliday's TESEP (tertiary, secondary, primary) ELT methods (1994) or D. Crystal's concepts of inner, outer, and expanding circle (1997).

As R. Ellis (2000: 209) rightly puts it: “learning arises not through interaction, but in interaction” while P. Riley (1985: 338), in turn, calls interaction a “collaborative construct”. The most fundamental unit of pedagogic discourse is the paradigm
worked out by H. Mehan (1974): “initiation – response – feedback” although, as it can be seen easily, this unequal “distribution of power” (teachers filling in two of the three slots) makes it incompatible with the communicative language teaching methodology.

Indeed, discourse rights such as, for instance: initiating and closing exchanges, determining their length, including and excluding participants or deciding on the number and order of their turns are granted to teachers but not learners. As a consequence, that particular discourse sample (the IRF paradigm) becomes monopolised by pedagogues. Such a remark stands for a perfect excuse for further, deeper analysis of learner (peer or interlanguage) talk, and teacher talk (teacherese), which will be undertaken in the final course of this study.

Finally, on a technical note, this monograph is my doctoral dissertation supervised by Prof. I. M. Świtała and defended at the University of Humanities and Economics in Łódź on 22nd February 2013 under the title Discourse analysis as the study of the language of communication in the linguistic perspective. The text has been thoroughly perused, amended or supplemented in some parts. All the translations from Polish sources are mine (ML).
1. Discourse as a communicative phenomenon

1.1. The concept of discourse

The present chapter begins with a brief introduction to the field of discourse seen subsequently through the lens of context. Attention then turns (in the next subsection) to the issue of discourse analysis, and one area in need of particular attention in this respect is also critical discourse analysis (presented in the final part of the present chapter).

It is worth paying attention at this point to D. R. Howarth’s (2000) viewpoint who, talking about the origins of discourse theory, concentrates on its three distinct periods. Namely, according to him (2000), the first major subject of research is the analysis of language in use – that is in context. This narrow concept of analysis focuses primarily on the rules governing the structure of sentences, or rather, a group of sentences, in speech or writing (D. R. Howarth 2000). In fact, as we shall see in the further course of the ongoing analysis, speech act theory (J. L. Austin 1976), which draws our attention to language in use and conversation analysis, investigates the roles accepted by interactants while they keep their conversation going. Following that – and thanks to, among others, D. R. Howarth (2000), discourse analysis as a new interdisciplinary field of research eventually emerges.

In light of these findings, chapter two sets, au fond, out to explore the notion of conversation analysis with the final section looking at speech acts. Only in this status quo, I am able to investigate classroom discourse in chapter three. Mindful of such an organisation, let me delve, in situ, into discourse first.

In contrast to the comparison of discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, it would be worth mentioning that one can also speak of classroom discourse analysis and critical classroom discourse analysis (CCDA) – the last term being coined by B. Kumaravadivelu (1999).

Language forms, be they verbal or non-verbal messages, can both refer to what a producer means by his or her text (understood as a record of a communicative act produced in a discursive event), and what such a text means to its receiver. Produced and interpreted as people communicate with each other, and whether it is, as B. Johnstone (2008a: 21) puts it, just “one discussion or a whole series of television debates, a single email or an extended correspondence, one conversation or all the talk that constitutes a relationship”, these forms have been termed discourse (discursus in the Latin language means running to and from). B. Johnstone (2008a: 2) also writes that:

‘[d]iscourse’ in this sense is usually a mass noun. Discourse analysts typically speak of discourse rather than discourses, the way we speak of other things for which we often use mass nouns, such as music (...).

Discourse, then, to put it bluntly, stands for language that is produced interactively by coparticipants (M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain 2007).
F. Grucza (2013a: 176), as far as the nature of communicating objects is concerned, distinguishes between the following types: person – person, person – animal, person – machine, animal – animal, machine – machine, pointing to the first (i.e. person – person) as the most fundamental communication system. Human linguistic communication is yet further subdivided into direct and indirect (F. Grucza 2013a: 177).

Paying attention to the fact that the representatives of structural linguistics confuse this issue, F. Grucza (2013b: 21) draws a distinction between: “a means of communication” and “a constituent of a means of communication. Indeed, F. Grucza (2013b: 21) writes that: “no constituents shall perform the very same function as the whole that consists of them” as the basic function (basic task) of any constituent (component) is to create such whole.

But some scholars, sometimes, might use the term discourse in a slightly distinct sense which depends, strictly speaking, on the circumstances in which it occurs; namely, as a count noun to signify experience from a particular perspective rather than language use conceived as social practice. As B. Johnstone (2008a: 3) further states:

‘[d]iscourses’ in this sense can be enumerated and referred to in the plural. (...) In other words, ‘discourses’ in this sense involve patterns of belief and habitual action as well as patterns of language. Discourses are ideas as well as ways of talking that influence and are influenced by the ideas. Discourses, in their linguistic aspect, are conventionalized sets of choices for discourse, or talk.

1.1.1. Oral versus written dichotomy

In the introduction to their seminal work: The handbook of discourse analysis, D. Schiffrin/ D. Tannen/ H. E. Hamilton (2008), having posed a question of what discourse actually stands for, make a reference to Ch. Fillmore’s (1981) examples to which I would like to refer right now and which, as a matter of fact, have appeared as two distinct signs at one swimming pool: Please use the toilets, not the pool and Pool for members only. In my analysis, I follow H. G. Widdowson’s standpoint (2007: 4) that:

[a] text can be defined as an actual use of language, as distinct from a sentence which is an abstract unit of linguistic analysis. We identify a piece of language as a text as soon as we recognize that it has been produced for a communicative purpose.

N. Fairclough (1995), in a similar vein, it needs to be stressed, apart from its (i.e. any text’s) solely communicative purpose (achieved or not) during the process of social interaction recognizes the simultaneous significance of cognition and representation of the world, too.

But whether a set of sentences does or does not constitute a text depends as well on cohesive relationships within and between the sentences which create texture and according to J. R. Martin (2008: 35):
[c]ohesion is one part of the study of texture, which considers the interaction of cohesion with other aspects of text organization. Texture, in turn, is one aspect of the study of coherence, which takes the social context of texture into consideration.

M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hassan (1976: 2) take the view that “a text has texture and this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text (...). The texture is provided by the cohesive relation”– cohesive relationships, in turn, created by the underlying semantic relation need yet to be supplemented by the notion of register or appropriateness to a particular context of any situation.

Any text, according to S. Grucza (2013a: 132, following F. Grucza 1988, 1997) stands for a “particular spoken or written linguistic expression performed by any speaker/listener during a particular act of linguistic communication”. What is more, S. Grucza (2013a: 132) reserves the term discourse for the description of a communicative interaction realised mainly with the help of texts. For clarity, S. Grucza (2013b: 66) suggests to use the term text-discourse (for any text sequence) and interaction-discourse (for any communicative interaction); cf. S. Grucza (2004, 2008).

As per specialist texts, S. Grucza (2013a) differentiates between: a) written specialist texts, b) spoken specialist texts, c) specialist discourse.

Register stands for a set of lexical and grammatical features defined by contextual and/or situational characteristics that accompany and help identify any discourse occurring in a particular recurrent situation. For example, speech and writing can be considered as two very general registers but it can also reflect the level of formality (higher register) or the level of informality (lower register) or its degree of technical specificity versus general usage.

It is not until the 17th/18th century that European national communities commence to form the first “national” cognitive specialist languages (S. Grucza 2013a). Their 18th-century development on the British Isles results from the technical revolution. S. Grucza (2013a) adds that the development of cognitive specialist languages (in the 18th century) first starts in France and then: England and Scotland, (in the 19th century) in Germany and is continued (in the mid 20th century) by other European countries.

It is useful to note at this stage that, taking the history of research of specialist languages into consideration, their perception as variants/varieties of general language results, at the end of the 1960s, in the distinction between two linguistic realities: one of them is referred to as a specialist language whereas the other – a general language (S. Grucza 2013a: 38). At the same time, the answer to the question of what distinguishes any specialist language from its general equivalent has been sought. Consequently, S. Grucza (2013a: 39) continues, in the 1970s, appropriate empirical analyses are conducted in order to determine syntactic features characteristic of specialist languages and, following that (in the 1980s) attempts are made so as to formulate a consistent/coherent theory of specialist languages with the aim of distinguishing specialist languages linguistics as a relatively separate field of study. The first independent academic institution of this type (not only in Poland but
also in Europe) is probably the Department of Specialist Languages, founded in 2000 at the Faculty of Applied Linguistics and East Slavonic Philologies at the University of Warsaw (S. Grucza 2013b: 8), which does not mean, however, the author further adds that Poland is the first country where scholars become interested in specialist languages from an academic point of view.

In research on language learning we also differentiate, on the whole, between foreigner and teacher talk. I shall be talking about the index notions throughout the course of this study in more detail.

M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hassan (1976: 13) dwell further on the idea of cohesion, semantic relation and text, and acknowledge that:

the concept of cohesion accounts for the essential semantic relations whereby any passage of speech or writing is enabled to function as a text. We can systematize this concept by classifying it into a small number of distinct categories (…) Each of these categories is represented in the text by particular features (…) which have in common the property of signalling that the interpretation of the passage in question depends on something else. If that ‘something else’ is verbally explicit, then there is cohesion. There are, of course, other types of semantic relation associated with a text which are not embedded in this concept; but the one that it does embody is in some way the most important, since it is common to text of every kind and is, in fact, what makes a text a text.

In the subsequent course of their study, the taxonomy of types of explicit markers of conjunctive relations (such as additive, casual or temporal) is defined, the presence of which, the authors (1976) insist, constitutes textness.

It would be worth noting that G. Cook (1989: 24) proposes to use the term utterance “for a unit of language used by somebody in context to do something – to communicate – and reserve sentence for grammatically complete units regarded purely formally, in isolation from their context and their function.” In doing so, she, de facto, supports and follows M. Coulthard’s (1985) previous findings that sentences create texts and utterances form discourses with grammatical cohesion relationship holding between the first (i.e. sentences), and discourse coherence between the latter (viz. utterances).

All in all, one can admit that sentences as the highest units of grammar get written and utterances spoken with some of the problems associated with spoken transcripts being absent when dealing with written texts, and vice versa. There are, however, other issues common for both, be they the choice of the target audience, text-producer relationships, the purpose of the text or the choice of appropriate forms to be used.

The role of utterances is emphasised by F. Grucza (2013: 175) who says that utterances, apart from speakers-listeners, understood as concrete signal facts (physical), stand for another (second) kind of objects upon which linguistics is based. Linguistic utterances, then, make sense and are of communicative value provided that they reach their intended recipient and are not only perceived by him/her but also recognized according to the sender’s intention (F. Grucza 2013: 175).
But no language, S. Grucza (2013a: 121) makes a remark, comes into being through speaking/writing or listening/reading – indeed, language, according to him, is what makes these particular activity types possible at all. In fact, speaking/writing results in texts (linguistic expressions) and (texts) listening/reading results in their comprehension. Said that, S. Grucza (2013a: 121) concludes: “(...) speaking/writing is a material realisation of linguistic utterances whereas listening/reading is a reconstruction of the meaning of these utterances.”

In addition to that, certain discourse can be largely monologic while other dialogic or multiparty in its nature. E. Ochs (1979) identifies the following features in discussing the differences between planned and unplanned language:

- planned – revised and polished, often context-reduced, with a variety of complex morphological and syntactic structures learnt later in life,
- unplanned – spontaneous, often context-embedded, with much dependence on morphological and syntactic features learnt early in life as well as frequent preponderance of repair mechanisms.

Talking of language use, T. Givón (1979) uses the term formal or informal communication. Examples of these are: clausal or phrasal (interactive talk) versus sentential (written) organization, left or (its mirror reflection also acting as an afterthought) right dislocation, topic-comment structures, nextness, parallelism, repair (especially unplanned discourse) and conjoined versus embedded clauses.

The oral versus written dichotomy is formulated on these grounds although D. H. Hymes (1964a) uses the word channel. As a consequence, we are dealing with the language produced online where speakers articulate words and expressions as they think of the ideas or careful and deliberate production, respectively. And J. L. Mey (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 787) says that on the basis of such a dichotomy unfolding along the spoken and the written word

...the former is commonly known as ‘conversation’; the latter comprises (but not exclusively) what is often referred to as ‘literature.’ Together, they constitute the principal ways in which humans produce text. In addition to the spoken, oral text, with its corresponding competence (often called ‘orality’ or ‘oracy’), there are written productions (mainly literary texts).

Discourse has been characterised as performing either a transactional or interactional (also known as interpersonal) function (G. Brown/ G. Yule 1983). Bearing in mind Ch. Fillmore’s (1981) examples, one is dealing, without any doubt, with the first as that is the function which language serves in the expression of its content: getting business done in the world.

In total opposition to it, therefore, stands the second, more phatic, function of language involved in expressing social relations and personal attitudes with another person prior to transactional talk. As M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007: 242) put it, transactional discourse is responsible for “primarily the transmission of information or the exchange of goods and services”, and interactional discourse “primarily shapes and maintains social relations as well as identifies and expresses the speaker’s/writer’s attitude toward the topic of the interlocutor”. A. Wray (2002) adds to that and specifies three aims that speakers might have: two major ones
involve referring and manipulating the hearer which broadly correspond to, respectively, interactional and transactional language functions while the third aim involves accessing information.

In a similar vein, M. A. K. Halliday (1975: 11-17) proposes as many as seven functional categories, applying them mostly to the very young child’s linguistic abilities. They are: instrumental (the I want function of language), regulatory (do as I tell you function), interactional (the me and you function), personal (language used to express the child’s own uniqueness), heuristic (the tell me why function), imaginative (the function of language whereby the child creates an environment of their own), and representational (using language to communicate information).

Last but not least, when talking about the oral versus written dichotomy – and concentrating solely on the latter, it is worth paying attention to E. Hinkel's (2001: 149) paper which “examines the frequency of overt example markers and particular types of examples provided in native speaker (NS) and nonnative speaker (NNS) academic essays”. Her work reveals the need for the writing process teaching practice although, E. Hinkel (2002 :190) remarks elsewhere:

[i]t is important to emphasize that written discourse conventions, much more than spoken, have the goal of developing textual and contextual cohesion by means of a conventionalized tense structure throughout a discourse frame.

The research in question involves more than one thousand university placement and diagnostic essays written during a period of 50 minutes, which stands for one class period, in four American universities. There are 1,087 students and 327,802 words in total of 206 native speaker students and 881 nonnative speaker students alike. Talking about the latter, the group includes: 190 speakers of Chinese, 184 speakers of Japanese, 166 speakers of Korean, 158 speakers of Vietnamese, and 183 speakers of Indonesian. The five prompts are (2001: 157):

- Some people believe that when parents make their children’s lives too easy, they can actually harm their children instead. Explain your views on this issue. Use detailed reasons and examples.
- Many people believe that grades do not encourage learning. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Be sure to explain your answer using specific reasons and examples.
- Some people learn best when a classroom lesson is presented in a serious, formal manner. Others prefer a lesson that is enjoyable and entertaining. Explain your views on this issue. Use detailed reasons and examples.
- Many educators believe that parents should help to form their children’s opinions. Others feel that children should be allowed to develop their own opinions. Explain your views on this issue. Use detailed reasons and examples.
- Some people choose their major field of study based on their personal interests and are less concerned about future employment possibilities. Others choose majors in fields with a large number of jobs and options for employment. What position do you support? Use detailed reasons and examples.

The distribution of student essays by prompt is: 216 essays are written on
prompt (1), 208 on prompt (2), 215 on prompt (3), 219 on prompt (4) and 229 on prompt (5), which is presented in more detail in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1 Group</th>
<th>Prompt 1 Parents</th>
<th>Prompt 2 Grades</th>
<th>Prompt 3 Manner</th>
<th>Prompt 4 Opinions</th>
<th>Prompt 5 Major</th>
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</table>

Table 1: Distribution of student essays by prompt (E. Hinkel 2001: 158)

The findings show, E. Hinkel (2001: 147) writes, that “NNS texts employ these features [frequency rates of example markers, first and third person pronouns, and the occurrences of past tense verbs, MŁ] at significantly higher rates than NS texts.” The results presented in table 2 indicate that any references to personal experiences in the past, used as instances in order to back the thesis of academic discourse up, are in common use just by nonnative speaker students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markers/ L1s</th>
<th>NNs</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>KR</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example markers</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First person pronouns</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>18.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third persons pronouns</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>24.34</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>17.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past tense verbs</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>13.02</td>
<td>11.82</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>11.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Median frequency rates for exemplification, pronouns, and past tense verbs in NS and NNS academic essays (%) (E. Hinkel 2001: 159)
Further in her work, E. Hinkel (2001: 151) also recalls the ETS (Educational Testing Service) study of writing tasks in academic degree programmes conducted in eight American and Canadian universities, the findings of which are:

82% of all undergraduate and 40% of graduate courses in social sciences and humanities require in-class essays ranging in length from short answer writing tasks to five pages. In physical sciences and engineering, 26% of undergraduate courses also require in-class writing, as do 59% of those taught in English departments.

A question might be asked why the study of this kind is important, and the best answer for that is formulated by P. L. Bizzell (1982). He (1982) claims, namely, that being a social construct (or as he calls it: a socially-situated act), academic texts reach beyond its authors' analysis of their inner explorations and thoughts, and as such, any personal examples or references seem, in fact, to be inappropriate when it comes to written academic discourse. And because of that, E. Hinkel (2001: 155) states:

\[ \text{most NSs have far greater (native) language proficiency in English than most NNSs (however advanced), NS students’ familiarity with academic discourse and text conventions may similarly greatly exceed that of NNSs with higher academic standing. Specifically, novice NS writers in colleges and universities have had a far lengthier and linguistically more advanced exposure to academic discourse and language uses in texts. For this reason, NS uses of examples and extended illustrative stories may demonstrate the conventions of academic text differently than those identified in NNS academic texts.} \]

Having said that, it needs to be pointed out that there are, however, some voices heard being in favour of including ad hominem stories, observations or experiences but only when it comes to formal academic text writing and composition instruction. To take an example, E. Hinkel (2001) recalls Connelly’s viewpoint (2000) that: “like personal observations, accounts of your own life can be convincing support (…) personal experiences can be emotionally powerful and commanding because the writer is the sole authority and expert. (…) Individual accounts can humanize abstract issues and personalize objective facts and statistics”.

1.1.2. Schematic structures of language

Confusion is the right word to describe what the public at the aforementioned swimming pool might experience should the index signs be read and analysed jointly, or, rather, one immediately after another. Indeed, as D. Schiffrin et al. (2008: 10) maintain:

Fillmore’s example captures what we might call the gift of discourse: new meanings are created through the relationship between sentences. But it also illustrates what we might call the curse of discourse: since more than one meaning can be created, how do we decide which meaning is intended, is justifiable, and/or makes the most sense?
Certainly, the main idea of using toilets and not the pool once a physiological need arises be rightly interpreted by both pool members and non-members as instructed by the pool management although, following H. G. Widdowson (2007: 7), I feel it would not be too difficult to find other real-life situations being able to prove that “no matter how explicitly we think we have textualized what we want to say, there is always the possibility that it will be interpreted otherwise”.

Those who have already tried such a form of entertainment before upon reading the signs, refer to amassed amounts of prior knowledge brought in with them, and which, in a communicative exchange, may or may not be shared. They, as a matter of fact, might refer to their past experience of similar events, too. These, together with the principle of analogy that assumes that everything remains as it has been so far unless there is given a specific notice that some aspects have changed, and the principle of local interpretation that instructs to do as little processing as possible, enable them to predict not only what is likely to happen but also what the relevant features of the context are likely to be (the ones which have been necessary and relevant in similar situations in the past). And M. Stubbs (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 304) writes that “we find a text easy to understand if it consists of familiar topics being talked about in familiar ways. If everything is totally familiar, of course, the text will strike us as boring or full of clichés. (...) Conversely, we find a text difficult to understand if it is lexically and semantically dense (...).”

It would be worth adding, at this point, that the principles in question form the basis of the natural assumption of coherence, an interactive process drawing upon such aspects of communicative knowledge (D. Schiffrin 2008) as: expressive (the ability to use language to display personal identities), social (the ability to use language to display social identities), cognitive (the ability to represent concepts and ideas through language), and textual (the ability to organize forms and convey meanings).

L. Lautamatti (1990) makes an important distinction between propositional and interactional coherence and says that the first creates a logical progression within the text while the latter is more prominent in spoken discourse. We need to remember that any text can be cohesive but incoherent though. In fact, M. McCarthy (2007: 26) reminds us that:

[c]ohesion is only a guide to coherence, and coherence is something created by the reader in the act of reading the text. Coherence is the feeling that a text hangs together, that it makes sense, and is not just a jumble of sentences.

Taking the above into consideration, our pool-users could make use of schema which is a set of cultural preconceptions about casual or other types of relationships that account for how people understand and remember stories; different cultural backgrounds can result in different schemata for the description of witnessed events. According to G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 247):

[i]t should be pointed out that, although a simple story may instantiate many elements in the story-schema, it is not suggested that the story has the schema. Rather, it is people who have schemata which they use to produce and comprehend simple stories.
The index term is employed by the psycholinguistic-cognitive group in the 1980s in their approach to reading, although introduced by F. Ch. Bartlett (1932) in *Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology*, where they (i.e. schemata) are treated as “active” and “developing”. In F. Ch. Bartlett’s (1932) classic experiments, H. H. Clark/M. M. Van Der Wege (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 781) state, “people were told a Native American folk story, ‘The War of the Ghosts,’ which included many elements unfamiliar to western norms. In retelling that story, people often distorted it to fit their cultural expectations. For example, many changed ‘hunting seals’ into ‘fishing,’ a more likely pastime in their schema”. Schematic structures of language stand for context in the head which we engage in to make sense of (that language) when realizing discourse from the text – as H. G. Widdowson (2007: 26) puts it:

> [t]he contexts that texts, whether spoken or written, are designed to key into are constructs of reality as conceived by particular groups of people, representations of what they know of the world and how they think about it.

Bearing this point in mind, we can, consequently, talk about two kinds of schemata: content and formal.

The perception of such context, however, is different from a story schema which, as D. E. Rumelhart (1975, 1977) and P. Thorndyke (1977) admit, readers employ in the comprehension of narrative texts. “But how similar do two occasions have to be in order to count as the same situation, given the fact that every occasion on which people use language is different from every other occasion?”, B. Johnstone (2008a: 178) asks. H. G. Widdowson (2007: 33) seems to have found the answer. According to him, there are some factors that enable message receivers to judge what the purpose of utterance might be and by equipping them with expectations and hypotheses about relevant aspects of context, summarised by T. A. Van Dijk (1977: 99) as “the assumed normality of the world”, he further explains that:

> [w]hat schemata do is to provide us with a convenient framework for understanding. Without them we would be at a loss to make sense of any text, or indeed to make sense of any of the circumstances of everyday life. At the same time they have their disadvantages in that they can impose a preconceived pattern on things and impede us from recognizing any alternative concept of reality.

Similar to the concept of schema is the notion of script developed by analogy to M. Minsky’s (1975) frame-theory. Indeed, M. Minsky (1975) claims that our knowledge is stored in memory in the form of data structures called frames which represent stereotyped situations. Script, in turn, delineates particular situations and guides our expectations about the presence and order of everyday events. E. Hatch (2001: 104), to give an example, is of the opinion that

> [w]hen adults encounter a new situation, they find very little of it truly new. Memory of past plans for achieving goals must be represented in some form, perhaps as scripts, in memory. If that were not the case, we would interpret each instance as a totally unknown event. Without script information, it would be impossible to interpret many ordinary exchanges.
According to her (2001), classroom per se can be perceived as a complete script. R. C. Schank/ R. P. Abelson (1977), drawing on R. C. Schank’s (1972) conceptual dependency theory, show that the structure of script includes a set of actions in temporal sequence to meet some goal and, thus, within any script there may be scenes, roles or a series of props. They also suggest that individual scripts are hierarchically organized in human memory.

R. C. Schank (1982) differentiates between two memory types described in case of failures under the system of thematic organization points (TOPs) for which M. G. Dyer/ W. G. Lehner (1980) use the term thematic affect units or thematic abstraction units (TAUs) – that is: general event memory and situation memory.

More general categories are termed memory organization packets (MOPS). Also, schemata have much in common with other studies in which the term scenario, coined by A. J. Sanford/ S. C. Garrod (1981), is more generally used, and G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 247), looking for a difference characterising the two, state that:

[i]f there is a difference between the use of these two terms, it appears to be that scenarios are situation-specific (at the cinema, in a restaurant), whereas schemata are much more general types of knowledge representations.

But A. J. Sanford/ S. C. Garrod (1981) are also the ones to develop the idea of missing links. Based on their research, two categories are eventually distinguished: automatic connections (made between elements in a text via pre-existing knowledge representations which could be used as a basis for deciding which missing links are, and which are not, likely to be inferences) and non-automatic connections (inferences requiring more interpretive work on the reader’s or hearer’s part than automatic connections made via pre-existing knowledge). I shall yet come back to the idea of inferences in the further course of the present study.

1.1.3. Content and form

Whatever the form (visual or textual, as opposed to verbal or non-verbal), it is the total set of features, or, strictly speaking, the total layout and not either the text, words or images alone that we associate with what we call discourse although H. G. Widdowson (2007: 6) argues that texts alone “do not contain meaning, but are used to mediate it across discourses.” Indeed, that content cannot be separated from its form is noticed by N. Fairclough (1995: 188) who “would argue that one cannot properly analyse content without simultaneously analysing form, because contents are always necessarily realized in forms, and different contents entail different forms and vice versa. In brief, form is a part of content.” More than that, any text produced in a discursive event, according to the author (1995: 7) can be regarded as a site of tension between centripetal pressures which “follow from the need in producing a text to draw upon given conventions, of two main classes; a language, and an order of discourse – that is, a historically particular structuring of discursive (text-producing) practices”, and centrifugal ones that “come from the specificity of particular situations of text-production, the fact that situations do not endlessly repeat
one another, but are, on the contrary, endlessly novel and problematic in new ways.”

R. H. Jones (in V. K. Bhatia et al. 2008) also draws a distinction between anticipatory and precipitative actions making discourse out of future (by anticipation) and past (by retrospection) actions, respectively while L. Polanyi (2008), referring to the linguistic discourse model (LDM) framework, reminds us that content and function are distinct in the form of two discourse units: the propositional content carrying the elementary discourse constituent unit and the extrapropositional discourse operator.

To sum up the ongoing analysis, the effect any discourse has on its recipients is influenced to some degree by its form, or, rather, structure: whether it is spoken or written, and not forgetting about any other modalities that can be combined with language. I am not talking here, though, about the lexical words that carry the same or similar meanings to the modal verbs from the classic epistemic modality (concerned with degrees of certainty and possibility) to the root modalities such as volition, permission or obligation.

Multimodal texts regarded as just one of the many modes of communication available for social interaction are accompanied by, and related to, other modes of communication, too (semiotic modes); such as, for instance: gestures, postures, pictures, diagrams, charts, layout, music and architectural design or proxemics – term coined by E. T. Hall (1966) to describe a set of measurable distances between people as they interact.

As a matter of fact, there are many levels of linguistic production which are involved in discourse design including:

- word selection,
- orthography (punctuation, capitalisation, italicisation, paragraphing etc.),
- syntactic and grammatical features (some constructions might be started and then abandoned in favour of other grammatical constructions – anacolutha, N. Fairclough 1995),
- phonetic and prosodic aspects (rhythmic and temporal features, speeding up and slowing down of the pace or pause and intonation),
- in the case of face-to-face interaction (gaze, posture, bodily orientation and the like).

One can also take, as far as the aforementioned relationship between discourse and grammar is concerned, a macropragmatic (S. C. Levinson 1983), that is top-down language processing or microanalytic (D. Schiffrin 1987), that is bottom-up language processing approach. Thus, according to M. McCarthy (1991: 62) “grammar is seen to have a direct role in welding clauses, turns and sentences into discourse”.

It would not be a challenging task at all for us to imagine and then try to answer which of the following would have most impact on those not adhering to the pool-environment rules in force: a lifeguard’s reprimand in a face-to-face interaction, an announcement made over the Tannoy or the signs we have been talking about – in different shapes, sizes and formats? Still easy if we think about our potential lifeguard’s tone of voice itself? How about adding an additional factor in the form of
some audience? And what difference does it make if some members of this audience appear to be well-known to the rule breakers? In my analysis, I am trying to prove, following B. Johnstone (2008a: 128), that:

[c]hoices about what to say or write, facts about how conversations emerge or texts get written, and conventions as to how discourse is to be interpreted all are influenced by who is involved in producing and receiving it. How a text or conversation is shaped and what it is taken to mean has to do in part with who the audience is understood to be, who the text’s producer or producers are, whether the person (or people) who write, sign, or speak the text are responsible for the text’s meaning or just relaying it, what the relationships among text- or talk-producers and other participants are and what the participants would like them to be, who else is listening, watching, or reading or might be, and how discourse producers and audiences are related to these overhearers and eavesdroppers.

1.2. Discourse and context

Discourse per se by referring to the activity of reading and interpreting a text makes a coherent (structured and meaningful) understanding of it. Texts, in turn, whether simple (our examples from the pool, for instance) or complex, are all representations of language produced with the main aim of referring to something for some purpose: communicative purpose. In fact, D. Biber/ S. Conrad (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 191) include communicative purpose within the three major communicative factors (two others being the physical relation between the addressor and the addressee, and production circumstances), and conclude that:

[w]ith respect to the last two of these factors, writing has a greater range of variability than speech. That is, while writing can be produced in circumstances similar to speech, it can also be produced in circumstances quite different from those possible in speech.

But all that happens in line with context understood as a situation in which discourse occurs (as distinguished from co-text which is the actual text surrounding any given lexical item), and in which a piece of discourse is being produced, circulated and interpreted. M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007: 4) in their “most satisfying definition of discourse” mention it (i.e. context) as the second equally important feature:

[a] piece of discourse is an instance of spoken or written language that has describable internal relationships of form and meaning (e.g. words, structures, cohesion) that relate coherently to an external communicative function or purpose and a given audience/interlocutor. Furthermore, the external function or purpose can only be properly determined if one takes into account the context and participants (i.e. all relevant situational, social, and cultural factors) in which the piece of discourse occurs.
J. Blommaert (2007: 134), to take a different viewpoint, sees context as “a singular point but a nexus of layered simultaneity” while H. G. Widdowson (2007: 20-21), on the other hand, as:

not an external set of circumstances but a selection of them internally represented in the mind (...) not what is perceived in a particular situation, but what is conceived as relevant (...).

Linguists become aware of the importance of context at the beginning of the 1970s and, according to J. Cutting (2008), the sorts of context to observe currently include: situational (what speakers know about what they can see around them), background knowledge (what they know about each other and the world), cultural (general knowledge that most people carry with them in their minds about different areas of life), interpersonal (specific and possibly private knowledge about the history of speakers themselves), social (the choice of politeness formulation depending on the social distance and the power relations between speakers), and, already mentioned, co-textual (known as co-text or discourse context: what they know about what they have been saying – the context of the text itself).

That said, A. Duranti/ Ch. Goodwin (1992), for example, propose four types of context: setting (physical, interactional), behavioural environment (nonverbal, kinetic), language (co-text, the reflexive use of language), extrasituational (social, political, cultural, and the like) whereas J. Harmer (1995), to take a different view, speaks of the students' world (physical surroundings and students' lives), the outside world (stories, situations and language examples – either simulated or real) and formulated information (timetables, notes, charts etc. – either simulated or real).

Incoming discourse can also be processed in two ways; videlicet we can distinguish between: bottom-up (data-driven) and top-down (theory-driven) interpretation where contextual features and prior knowledge are used to process new information (that is prior knowledge, known as content schemata, and sociocultural and discourse knowledge, known as formal schemata, get combined).

The whole idea is perfectly grasped by H. Holec (1985: 23) who admits that “discourse does not refer solely to the text itself (verbal and non-verbal messages), but also to the context as well as psychologically and sociologically constrained situation, i.e. the circumstances in which the text is produced and interpreted (who addresses whom, with what communicative goal in mind)”. But context, I would like to emphasise after J. Blommaert (2007: 45), “is not something we can just ‘add’ to text – it is text, it defines its meanings and conditions of use”.

Context, then, ex definitione, can be explained by knowledge of the physical and social world and is a truly omnipresent phenomenon. “Context is potentially everything and contextualisation is potentially infinite”, J. Blommaert (2007: 40) writes. Both pragmatics – criticised though by N. Fairclough (1989) for its individualism and idealism, and discourse analysis (which becomes the focus of attention of my analysis later) study the meaning of words in context as well as all psychological or sociological factors influencing communication, too. “Pragmatics and discourse analysis have much in common: they both study context, text and
function”, says J. Cutting (2008: 2) adding a remark that what discourse analysis calls coherence, pragmatics calls relevance.

Both differ, however, in their emphases on the structure of text or the importance given to the social principles of discourse. Indeed, discourse analysis is more centred around the well-formedness of texts while pragmatics around the process of text production and deals with the social, cultural and physical aspects of the situations that shape how people communicate with each other. In the view of G. Yule (1996), speaker meaning and contextual meaning rather than sentence meaning are the key characteristics of the area of pragmatics. In addition to that, as J. Cutting (2008: 3) further puts it:

[pragmatics takes a socio-cultural perspective on language usage, examining the way that the principles of social behaviour are expressed is determined by the social distance between speakers. It describes the unwritten maxims of conversation that speakers follow in order to cooperate and be socially acceptable with each other.]

The traditional language analysis contrasts pragmatics, that is, as it has been said above, the interlocutor-related analysis of factors such as age and social relationship as well as communicative factors of one’s overall communicative competence (such as politeness and appropriacy) with syntax – the area of language analysis that describes the relationships between linguistic forms, and semantics – the area of language analysis that describes how meaning is encoded in language. And, as for the notion of human communication itself, M. Coulthard (1985: 1) makes a point that it “must be described in terms of at least three levels – meaning, form and substance, or discourse, lexi-co-grammar and phonology”; other relevant features might also include the assumption of similar general experience of the world, sociocultural or communicative conventions.

In fact, when people communicate with one another by either orienting to their own and others’ roles in the social world (professional or personal footing or framing), making use of whatever communicative channels (modes) become available or the engagement of schematic or systemic knowledge (including the application of interpersonal schemata, too – H. G. Widdowson 2007), they try to key language forms (both verbal and non-verbal) into context. Such context, produced by some first-person party (speaker/writer), is assumed to be ideally shared for intended message to get across to some second-person party (listener/reader) straightaway and, thus, facilitate achieving potential communicative goals and avoid, at times contentious, argumentation. H. G. Widdowson (2007) uses the term ideational constructs for such shared conceptions of reality; to put it in his (2007: 9–10) words:

[when people communicate with each other, they draw on the semantic resources encoded in their language to key into a context they assume to be shared so as to enact a discourse, that is, to get their intended message across to some second person party. The linguistic trace of this process is the text. In the case of conversation, the text is jointly produced as the discourse proceeds by overt interaction, and it typically disappears once it has served its purpose.]
In the case of writing the text is unilaterally produced and remains as a permanent record.

Goals, in turn, are just one of the examples of categories of context, the final list of which, according to T. A. Van Dijk (2008: 356), also includes:

the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres), participants in various communicative, social, or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies.

Natural effort after meaning (the term coined by F. Ch. Bartlett in the 1930s and stating that what is said or written makes sense in its very own context) certainly helps the above assumption. Equally important are the responses (or even confirmations alone, as is the case of invariant rule of discourse – H. G. Widdowson 2007) that people get from their interlocutors, too as these not only display understandings of prior actions but can also themselves create contingencies for subsequent ones. The process of confronting from the right angle the linearization problem, where speakers/writers have to choose a beginning point, influences hearers’/readers’ interpretation of what follows once the initial textual context has been established. H. G. Widdowson (2007: 43) acknowledges that “what is said at a particular point naturally makes reference to what has been said before and a context is created in the mind and signalled in the text in the process of production”.

Such a set of discourse internal elements: people, events, facts, places etc. introduced in the preceding co-text is named the domain of discourse.

1.2.1. Discourse thematisation devices

Obviously, people do have a choice not only what to include but also what to exclude when the communicative channel is open at the discourse local level and it often happens that by either saying too little or too much context boundaries, significant for the conclusions drawn, become blurred. Having said that, at least two versions, as G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 90) put it, of “[w]hat I think we’re talking about” get created and, potentially, might become incompatible (although listeners/readers usually tend to predict what is to come).

As a matter of fact, people can both select appropriate discourse forms and plan sequential moves as communication involves finding such words that have the desired effect or allow, on the other hand, for a biased expression of attitude, personal evaluation or point of view.

Conversation or discourse topics are usually not fixed beforehand in any way either but, rather, negotiated by the parties concerned, and it often happens that some elements do not become salient until one of the parties mentions them in their course of conversation again. By the notion of topic I mean any single proposition or semantic representation expressed as a phrase or sentence (as distinguished from the
grammarians’ sentential topic important for skills such as skim-reading). W. Chafe (2008: 674) explains it in the following way: “a coherent aggregate of thoughts introduced by some participant in a conversation, developed either by that participant or another or by several participants jointly, and then either explicitly closed or allowed to peter out”.

W. Chafe (2008) further makes a reference to the idea of supertopic – a more inclusive term for a basic level of topic-hood. It is useful as well to distinguish between a topic entity – the main character notion and a general pretheoretical notion of topic equivalent to title – what is being talked about. From the point of view of E. Hatch (2001: 33):

Topics in a conversation are dynamic and are negotiated as a conversation progresses. For this reason, we cannot really say that a discourse has a topic; only speakers and writers do.

Discourse title, in turn, serves as a particularly powerful thematisation device providing a starting point for subsequent shaping discourse structure and its interpretation; in the case of the written mode, it also divides texts into smaller chunks. As a default practice, and notwithstanding the fact that English, following a canonical sentence structure (the strategy of perceptual heuristics), is what is often called an SVO language (M. McCarthy 2007) with a fairly rigid or fixed, syntactically determined, word order (S. A. Thompson 1978), speakers tend to put relatively familiar information at the beginning of sentences (preposing), and relatively unfamiliar information closer to their end (postposing). But for connectionism, which maintains that although language can be described by rules, it is worth noting, it does not necessarily follow that language use is a product of rule application.

Hearers, as a rule, then, expect such information structure order (sometimes also in a partially ordered set or poset relationship where out of two elements one can be of either lower, higher or equal rank to the other) to happen. Theme is a formal category in the analysis of sentences marking the starting point of any utterance (found in the discussion on discourse instead of the concept of grammatical subject) with everything else that follows constituting rheme. H. G. Widdowson (2007: 42-43) makes a point that:

An item of information might be given the status of theme because the first-person text producer, P1, assumes it to be given, that is to say, already known by the second-person receiver, P2. In this case, the theme simply confirms common knowledge and sets the scene for the new information to be provided in the rheme. Conversely, the theme could signal the main topic that P1 wants to talk about, with the rheme representing comment on that topic. P1’s use of the theme/rheme sequence to signal given/new information is clearly P2-oriented and co-operative: it expresses, we might say, consideration of P2’s position (Let me remind you of what you know already ...).
1.2.2. Politeness and context-dependent forms

Negotiations and modifications are not the only strategies employed by speakers in order to mitigate the threat of communication failure or for the communication process to proceed without undue friction. Speakers might adhere to felicity conditions and use their judgement in what circumstances it is or is not appropriate to make a particular request.

Another commonly found practice is referring to politeness – although speakers encountering difficulties in talking might well use such strategies as avoidance, paraphrase or transfer, too. R. T. Lakoff (1973) differentiates between three rules of politeness which are necessary for any smooth social interaction; these are:

- **Formality (Distance):** Do not impose on others; be sufficiently aloof.
- **Hesitancy (Deference):** Allow the addressee options about whether or not to respond and about how to respond.
- **Equality (Camaraderie):** Act as if you and the addressee are equal; make the addressee feel good.

Indeed, the area of politeness (a truly pragmatic phenomenon) deals with different forms of strategies which help enhance social harmony and when acquiring one’s first language, a person learns it as a part of their sociocultural and pragmatic competence (the latter is also responsible for conversational, culturally appropriate and socially acceptable ways of interacting). According to G. Leech (1983), there is a politeness principle consisting of six conversational maxims: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy; the first and second form a pair as do the third and the fourth.

P. Brown/ S. C. Levinson (1987: 13), in turn, following E. Goffman (1955) in their analyses of politeness say that in order to enter into social relationships, we have to acknowledge and show an awareness of a face (the public self-image, the sense of self, of the people that we address) which they claim “consists of two specific kinds of desires (‘face-wants’) attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive face)”.

They further say that it is a universal characteristic across cultures that speakers should respect each others’ expectations regarding their self-image, take account of their feelings and avoid any face threatening acts (FTAs); a threat to one’s face or self esteem is called a loss of face (I will yet return to this notion).

The addressee’s task of interpretation can be made more difficult, but not necessarily constitute a failure to communicate if no shift from one topic to the next is marked. Indicators of topic-shifts, most frequently used by conversationalists, are such structural units and markers which are called discourse markers (D. Schiffrin 1987); other terms include R. E. Longacre’s mystery particles (1976) and L. J. Brinton’s pragmatic markers (1996); their examples are:

- paratones (intonational cues signalling the start of speech paragraphs),
- fillers (words like er, mmm or well),
• paralinguistic signalling (gaze, facial expressions, eye and body movements, ad hoc head nods etc.), or
• new orthographic paragraphs and adverbial expressions (adjuncts, conjuncts and disjuncts).

As per the latter, they tend to appear strictly in the case of writing.

In the further part of the following chapter, I would like to analyse context-dependent forms, and, later, also cohesive devices (both grammatical and lexical ones). As for the first then, these are:

a) deictic markers

Any discourse, T. Venneman (1975: 314) maintains, possesses a presupposition pool with information “constituted from general knowledge, from the situative context of the discourse, and from the completed part of the discourse itself”.

The number of discourse subjects in a presupposition pool shared by participants who know one another well is quite large and can be of some help once such a need arises.

More than that, there are also some linguistic elements requiring contextual information for their interpretation called deictic forms (their name comes from the Greek word deixis which means “pointing”; as a linguistic term, then, it would mean “identification by pointing”). S. C. Levinson (1983) identifies five major types of deictic markers: person, place, time, discourse, and social.

These are the words such as the spatial expression here showing the relationship between space and the location of discourse participants (a distinction between close and away from the speaker is recognised in most languages or proximal and distal, respectively) or temporal now referring to time relative to the time of speaking.

Personal pronouns, or personal pro-forms, marking participant roles in a speech event and used by speakers to refer to current topic entities in discourse like I, you or demonstratives like this and that are the examples of discourse deixis which keep track of reference in any unfolding interaction.

Demonstratives, pronouns and prepositions belong to a closed system (also known as grammar, function or empty words), the major function of which is to carry a grammatical meaning. Such a distinction enables us to separate off those words that belong to an open system (sometimes called lexical, content or full words) and which belong to the major word classes of noun, verb, adjective and adverb.

Last but not least, one can talk about social deixis used to code the social relationships between speakers and their addressees or audience further subdivided into relational (a person’s or persons’ location in relation to the speaker rather than by their roles in the society as a whole) and absolute (forms uniformly attached to a social role).

It is necessary to know who the speaker and hearer are and the time and place of the production of their discourse in order to interpret them (i.e. those deictic forms) in any particular piece of discourse.

b) presupposition

The indicated source of which is the speaker and which, by T. Givón (1979: 50),
is “defined in terms of assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge”.

c) implicature

Implicature is another term used by H. P. Grice (1975) drawing on the ordering of ordo naturalis to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest or mean (as distinct from what the speaker literally says). This, in turn, reminds me of J. Sinclair’s (1991) idiom principle (as opposed to the open-choice principle) according to which the meaning of much of spoken or written texts is attached to and implied by the whole phrase (in a common phraseology) and not its individual components.

In the further course of my study, I shall analyse the notion of conversational implicature which stands for the meaning conveyed by speakers and recorded as a result of hearers’ inferences (as opposed to conventional implicature which philosophers and linguists categorise in terms of entailment, paraphrase, conventional metaphorical meanings, presupposition and implicatives) in the context of the cooperative principle. As we shall be able to see, we can violate H. P. Grice’s (1975) maxims and still be a cooperative conversationalist.

d) inference

Inference is a context-dependent and text-specific process which the reader or hearer must go through to get from the literal meaning of what is written or said to what the writer or speaker has intended to convey. Inference must be relied on by any discourse analyst if they are to arrive at the right interpretation of utterances or for the connections between utterances alone.

e) deferred ostention

Deferred ostention is the notion developed by G. Nunberg (1978, 1979), and later developed by G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007), which claims that our interpretation of certain definite noun phrases is based on our pragmatic knowledge of their range of reference.

f) intertextuality and appropriateness

Intertextuality, the term coined by R. De Beaugrande/ W. Dressler (1981), signifies a process (i.e. reference) whereby we borrow, repeat, cite and re-cite expressions, texts or ideas already produced by others across genres. J. Kristeva (1986) distinguishes further between horizontal intertextuality (how texts build on texts with which they are related sequentially or syntagmatically) and vertical intertextuality (how texts build on texts that are paradigmatically related to them).

Describing the above processes, the notion of appropriation is useful too: using and reusing of borrowed building blocks that get appropriated or made, by successful speakers, their own.

N. Fairclough (1995) sketches a three-dimensional framework for conceiving of, and analysing, discourse: discourse-as-text (i.e. the linguistic features and organisation of concrete instances of discourse), discourse-as-discursive-practice (i.e. discourse as something which is produced, circulated, distributed or consumed in any society), and discourse-as-social-practice (i.e. the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is seen to operate).
In the case of the middle dimension N. Fairclough (1995) yet distinguishes between manifest intertextuality (i.e. overtly drawing upon other texts) and constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity as the ways in which discourses draw on previous discourses (i.e. texts that are made up of heterogeneous elements: generic conventions, discourse types, register and style).

Intertextual analysis as a whole, grouped by N. Fairclough (1995: 188) together with pragmatics and text interpretation (linguistic analysis, in turn, falls within text description), is preoccupied with showing “how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations of conventionalized practices (genres, discourses, narratives, etc.) which are available to text producers and interpreters in particular social circumstances”. Instances of those conventionalized practices will certainly not be missed in the further course of this chapter.

Talking of grammatical cohesive devices, the best known treatment of cohesion is that of M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hasan (1976) who, in total, describe five: general grammatical (reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction) and lexical strategies commonly used.

g) reference, co-referential and coclassificational forms

The first of these cohesive devices is reference which is the term used to indicate the relationships between discourse participants and elements in discourse. Linguistic forms, known as referring expressions, help identify the entity being referred to as the referent (rather than the potential relationship of one sentence to another). On that nature, J. Lyons (1977: 177) makes a point that “it is the speaker who refers (by using some appropriate expression): he invests the expression with reference by the act of referring”.

J. Lyons (1977) also suggests that the term reference is better replaced by the term denotation (a set of objects to which it can correctly be applied) in considerations of lexical meanings. In formal semantics, successful reference depends on the hearer’s identifying the speaker’s intended referent on the basis of the referring expression used. G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 211), to give an example, draw on K. Donnellan’s distinction (1966)

between a situation in which one refers to a specific individual by using an expression such as the killer and an alternative situation in which one uses the expression the killer, not for a specific individual, but meaning ‘whoever did the killing’. The first use Donnellan says is ‘referential’, the second he describes as ‘attributive’.

Strictly connected with the index notion (i.e. reference) are co-referential forms which, as M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hasan say (1976: 31), “instead of being interpreted semantically in their own right (...) make reference to something else for their interpretation” and so refer to the same entity. The major difference between reference and co-referential forms is that the relationship, or, rather, tie of the first is taken to hold between expressions in texts and entities in the world while, as per the later, in different parts of texts (for instance: antecedent-anaphor relation holding between a full nominal expression and a pronominal referring expression such as *it*).
Finally, coclassificational forms refer to the same class of entities. These are forms directing message recipients to look elsewhere for their interpretation which, on the basis of their relationship, can further be subdivided into: a) exophoric or outward references whose interpretation lies outside any given text – in the context of a particular situation and contribute to textuality (that is the feeling that something is a text and not just a random collection of sentences) and b) endophoric references, the interpretation of which lies within the same text. The latter are of two kinds: those looking back in the text for their interpretation are called anaphoric while those withheld, that is looking forward in the text for their interpretation, cataphoric.

When noun phrases are not linked explicitly to each other but one noun phrase is linked to entities associated with another noun phrase, we are dealing with associative endophora (which depends on elements of both endophora and exophora).

h) substitution
Another kind of a cohesive tie can be created by the use of words or phrases that substitute a text referent in the same grammatical slot for material elsewhere in the text (substitution tends to be endophoric then).

i) ellipsis
Closely related to the above mentioned grammatical strategies is ellipsis, known as a “zero tie”; it creates cohesive ties via omission (interpreters have to go elsewhere in the text or the discourse context to fill in potential blanks).

The English language has broadly three types of ellipsis operating, similarly to substitution, at three levels: nominal, verbal and clausal.

j) conjunction
Fourth is conjunction with its use of any one of a variety of strategies to show how sentences are related in meaning to other sentences and the three category headings applicable here are: elaboration, extension and enhancement.

M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hasan (1976) also distinguish between lexical cohesion (or lexical ties) which use the same words repeatedly in the form of synonyms, antonyms, meronyms or hyponyms.

Superordinates and general words belong to this category, too. Two principal kinds of the relations between vocabulary items in texts, according to M. A. K. Halliday/ R. Hasan (1976), are: collocation (the probability that lexical items will co-occur) and reiteration (repeating an item by direct repetition or else reasserting its meaning by exploiting lexico-semantic relations).

To sum up this part on grammatical and lexical cohesive devices, let me quote J. Cutting’s remark (2008: 11) that “[g]rammatical cohesion (reference, substitution and ellipsis) holds the text together, but so does lexical cohesion”.

1.2.3. Contextualisation processes

Bearing in mind what H. G. Widdowson (2007: 22) says, namely that “[c]ontext is a psychological construct, a conceptual representation of a state of affairs”, let us
imagine the two pool signs being decontextualised and displayed in a completely different environment: in a supermarket or at the airport – how much sense would they make there?

Obviously none for, as J. Blommaert (2007: 43) claims, we only “understand something because that something makes sense in a particular context”. Indeed, J. Blommaert (2007) further notices that whether contextualised (connected to and made meaningful in terms of its context), recontextualised (placed in a new context) or entextualised (successively decontextualised and metadiscursively recontextualised), a text does not establish context on its own at all. In fact, by being indexical (emerging out of the text-context relations) and so suggesting, apart from denotational also metapragmatic/metadiscursive (i.e. about the forms of language use) or metalinguistic (i.e. about linguistic structure) features of meaning, it (that is any text) helps, as already (though indirectly) indicated above, activate it (i.e. the context) in the public’s mind. Understood as knowledge of the socio-physical world, we do think of context, as H. G. Widdowson (2007: 19) puts it bluntly, “as situations in which we find ourselves, the actual circumstances of time and place, the here and now of the home, the school, the work place, and so on”. But, at the same time, we cannot forget that these situations, different in their nature as they are, each time might be interpreted differently by different groups of people.

1.2.4. How discourse is shaped by its context and how discourse shapes its context

Text trajectories are understood as patterns of shifting and transferring bits of discourse through a series of entextualisations. J. Blommaert (2007: 255) provides his readers with an example of the situation where “a patient’s oral narrative is written down in scribbled notes by a psychiatrist, who then writes a (prose) summary of it and talks about it to colleagues, who in turn take notes and incorporate elements of the narrative into a published paper”.

B. Johnstone (2008a: 10), on the other hand, goes beyond that in her analysis, and lists six examples of the shaping of texts that constitute a heuristic for exploring – how discourse is shaped by its context, and how discourse shapes its context. Among them, we might distinguish factors such as the world, language, participants – according to M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007), there are at least three participants: the writer, the text, and the reader in the case of a written text, prior/future discourse, medium and purpose:

- Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world.
- Discourse is shaped by language, and discourse shapes language.
- Discourse is shaped by participants, and discourse shapes participants.
- Discourse is shaped by prior discourse, and discourse shapes the possibilities for future discourse.
- Discourse is shaped by its medium, and discourse shapes the possibilities of its medium.
- Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes.
We are able to note immediately that from the point of view of B. Johnstone (2008a: 10), discourse arises out of the world of both its creators and interpreters and strictly depends on and influences them. Not without any significance are the interpersonal relations between the two parties (i.e. the first-person party versus the second-person party), and sometimes these two parties’ environments, or, rather, contexts may be extended by the presence of some extra audience – E. Goffman’s overhearers and eavesdroppers (1955, 1976) who might be involved either in producing or interpreting some texts, or both.

M. Coulthard (1985: 79) notes the concept of tellability or newsworthiness used by conversationalists, and which means that out of many events (either experienced, seen or heard) “some are ‘tellable’, some aren’t, and of those that are tellable some are tellable to everyone, some have a restricted audience, some must be told immediately, some can wait and still retain their interest”. In addition to that, the natural order (presenting a sequence of events in time with the event that happened first being placed before the event that followed it) might sometimes be substituted by an unstated implication of a relationship in which the second event in some sense follows from (or is caused by) the first: post hoc ergo propter hoc (non-logical inference) characterised by L. Horn (1973) or perceptual salience (more salient entity first) suggested by T. A. Van Dijk (1977). The latter is only overridden by the maintenance of a consistent point of view or angle of vision (Ch. Fillmore 1981).

But the base for any interpretation (reliance on the syntactic structure and lexical items used) lies in discourse being produced first; indeed, a need to communicate some message needs to occur. From G. Brown/ G. Yule’s (2007) viewpoint, there are as many as three aspects of the process of interpreting any speaker’s/writer’s intended meaning in producing discourse, and these involve: computing the communicative function (how the message should be taken), using general socio-cultural knowledge (facts about the world) and determining the inferences to be made (context-dependent and text-specific processes). J. E. Grimes (1975) claims that staging (the way a piece of discourse is staged in a discourse structure) has a significant effect on interpretation processes and subsequent recall, too.

Strictly connected with written texts is another level of interpretation which relies on recognising textual patterns manifested in the functional relationships between textual segments. M. McCarthy (2007) lists such interpretive acts as: phenomenon-reason, cause-consequence, instrument-achievement (all three brought under the general heading of logical sequence relations), phenomenon-example and, finally, clause-relational.

Needless to say, there are as many uses of discourse, ways of presenting it or purposes for its existence as there are human cultures and, although B. Johnstone (2008a) advises that there is no need of following any of her ideas in any particular order, one can easily spot that they all are tightly interwoven.

D. H. Hymes (1964a), in contrast, specifies the features of context relevant to the identification of the type of speech event to which he includes:

- the roles of addressor and addressee (speaker/writer versus hearer/reader; adding later audience too),
- the category of topic (what is being talked about),
- setting (place and time as well as physical relations of interactants),
- channel (mode of either speech, writing or signing),
- code (language and its dialect or style),
- message-form (chat, debate, sermon etc.),
- event (the nature of a communicative event).

Two more features supplemented by him are: key (involving evaluation) and purpose (participants’ intention).

But in order to conceive the extent of discourse diversity and, as J. Blommaert (2007: 3) puts it, its “connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developments of use” a much broader concept ought to be introduced now, namely, that of discourse analysis (or discourse studies) – understood as the study of the relationship between language and context in which it is used.

Its propagators are people that work with “material of many kinds, including transcripts of audio- or videorecorded interactions, written documents, texts transmitted via oral tradition such as proverbs, and printouts of online communication. Their material sometimes consists of words alone and sometimes includes pictures, gestures, gaze, and other modalities” (B. Johnstone (2008: 9).

It is worth noting that in the first handbook of discourse analysis, T. A. Van Dijk (1985) identifies classical rhetorical writers (Aristotle, Quintilian or Cicero) as the very first discourse analysts.

1.3. Discourse analysis

E. Hatch (2001: 1) defines discourse analysis as “the study of the language of communication – spoken or written. The system that emerges out of the data shows that communication is an interlocking social, cognitive, and linguistic enterprise.” In line with that, B. Johnstone (2008a) wonders about the etymology of the term in question which comprises such different approaches as: speech act theory, interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, pragmatics, conversation analysis and variation analysis, and the two main goals of which are critical and descriptive.

B. Johnstone (2008a: 4) also suggests that this linguistic analysis be eventually compared to a chemical one. The similarity here has nothing to do with the processes themselves, however, but, rather, the ways that the answer to the question of how to interpret their outcomes are sought for

[why discourse analysis rather than ‘discourseology,’ on the analogy of ‘phonology,’ ‘discourseography,’ on the analogy of ‘ethnography,’ or ‘discourse criticism,’ on the analogy of ‘literary criticism’ or ‘rhetorical criticism’? The answer has to do with the fact that discourse analysis typically focuses on the analytical process in a relatively explicit way. It is useful to think of discourse analysis as analogous to chemical analysis. (...) What distinguishes discourse analysis from other sorts of study that bear on human
language and communication lies not in the questions discourse analysts ask but in the ways they try to answer them: by analyzing discourse – that is, by examining aspects of the structure and function of language in use.

As for the origin of discourse analysis, it dates back to 1952 with Z. Harris’ paper of that title fixing its name – I follow M. McCarthy’s argument here (1991). Although discourse analysis initially only focuses on actual language (either written or spoken) used in social contexts (contextual analysis), it is worth noting that it soon grows into a wide-ranging and heterogeneous discipline (comes to be called systemic) and deals with whole systems of communication like literary texts, culture and symbolic systems, taking into account the existing relationship between participants and the effect it has on conversation topics (J. Majer 2003). Such a move, in turn, from purely sociocontextual aspects towards an interest in sociocultural ones as well finds its reflection in the definition of discourse analysis by V. K. Bhatia et al. (2008: 1) emphasizing

[the idea that language can be analysed not just on the level of the phoneme/morpheme, the word, the clause or the sentence, but also on the level of the text, and the idea that language ought to be analysed not as an abstract set or rules, but a tool for social action.

1.3.1. Discourse analysis as an interdisciplinary area

Although it grows out with discourse analysts studying language in use first (written, spoken or signed), in the 1960s and early 1970s it also starts to attract a variety of other disciplines too; “[i]n current usage, the term ‘discourse analysis’ is polysemic. On the one hand, it refers to the close linguistic study, from different perspectives, of texts in use. On the other hand, discourse refers to socially shared habits of thought, perception, and behaviour reflected in numerous texts belonging to different genres”, R. Scollon/ S. W. Scollon (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 538) maintain.

Talking of genre (in French it means a kind), it is any communicative purpose that gives it a shape and internal structure, and one can distinguish between three conventional types of literary texts (culturally and linguistically distinct forms of discourse) such as: narrative or descriptive (epic), mimetic or imitative (dramatic), and self-expressive (lyric).

Let me return to the major point of the foregoing discussion, however – the term discourse analysis is now used to describe activities at the intersection of fields as diverse as:

- general or theoretical linguistics (the branch of linguistics that is most concerned with developing models of linguistic knowledge),
- sociology (the branch of social sciences traditionally focused on social relations, social stratification, social interaction, culture and deviance),
- sociolinguistics (the study of such aspects of society as cultural norms, expectations and context or the way language is used; interactional
sociolinguistics instead concentrates on speech exchanges in both monolingual and multilingual communicative situations as its main object of study).

- semiotics (also called semiotic studies or semiology which is the study of sign processes or signification and communication),
- psychology (academic and applied science involving the scientific study of mental functions and behaviour),
- psycholinguistics or the psychology of language (the study of the psychological and neurobiological factors that enable humans to acquire, use and understand language),
- anthropology (the study of humanity),
- philosophical linguistics (the study of semantic relationships between constructed pairs of sentences and their syntactic realisations),
- computational linguistics (producing models of discourse processing),
- artificial intelligence (claiming that human beings’ central property is intelligence: the sapience of homo sapience),
- rhetoric (the art of using language, especially public speaking and writing, as a means to persuade); contrastive rhetoric, it would be worth noting, is only a subfield of written discourse initiated by R. B. Kaplan (1966) and applied to ESL/EFL teaching that indicates the difficulty that students, coming from different cultural backgrounds, encounter when reading or writing expository texts.

Bearing these points in mind, another term has come to be used in a parallel fashion to discourse analysis: text linguistics. It is focused, though, on written texts from a variety of fields and genres.

1.3.2. Communicative competence

D. Schiffrin/ D. Tannen/ H. E. Hamilton (2008: 3) admit openly that “work in discourse analysis is now so diverse that ‘discourse’ is almost a synonym for ‘language’”. B. Johnstone (2008a: 2) associates it also with talk and communication and adds to that by saying that “what most people mean when they say 'language' is talk, communication, discourse.” Indeed, little in common as all the above described fields in the previous subsection have, the discipline which this interdisciplinary area calls upon, to varying degrees though, is linguistics – at first in its descriptive form, and latterly, applied – a truly amorphous and heterogeneous field indeed (R. Carter/ D. Nunan 2006).

Talking of linguistics, according to F. Grucza (2013a: 117), it can be divided into traditional and applied; one cannot agree though, the author continues, that the difference between these two subfields is that traditional linguistics concentrates on cognitive whereas applied linguistics on pragmatic aims only. In reality, F. Grucza (2013a: 117) says, both applied and traditional linguistics are, to the same degree, of cognitive nature and their aim is to create knowledge, and merely knowledge. There
is no doubt though that applied and traditional linguistics deal with the creation of different kinds of knowledge.

August Ferdinand Bernhardi, a German scholar and linguist, is the first to distinguish, at the end of the 18th century, applied linguistics from traditional linguistics. Second on the list, on a world scale, is Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (F. Grucza 2013a: 50). Later in his work, however, F. Grucza (2013a: 185) adds that it would be a serious mistake if the date of Bernhardi’s work be acknowledged as the date determining the beginning of the history of applied linguistics at all. Indeed, as F. Grucza (20013a: 185) further admits it (the date of Bernhardi’s work) primarily determines the very beginning of the history of distinguishing applied linguistics and, thus, distinguishing between traditional linguistics and applied linguistics from linguistics understood in a very general sense.

The real goal of linguistics according to D. H. Hymes (1972) is the description of communicative competence which V. K. Bhatia et al. (2008: 5), in turn, confirm to involve

[n]ot just mastery of the linguistic system, but the ability to use language in conjunction with social practices and social identities in ways which others in the community will recognize to perform a myriad of social activities such as engaging in small talk, making transactions, joking, arguing, teasing, and warning.

And H. G. Widdowson (2007: 14) sees it to incorporate “both a knowledge of what is encoded as possible in the language and a knowledge of how these encodings are used appropriately in context”. D. H. Hymes (in: J. D. Gumperz./ D. H. Hymes 1972) distinguishes between four aspects of competence by which any utterance, or extended piece of discourse, can be described or even judged: 1) systematic potential (whether and to what extent something is not yet realised), 2) appropriateness (whether and to what extent something is suitable, effective or the like), 3) occurrence (whether and to what extent something is done) and 4) feasibility (whether and to what extent something is possible).

Following M. Canale (1983, in: M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain 2007) we can usefully see communicative competence as being composed of, also four, areas of knowledge and skill:

- linguistic or grammatical (knowledge and skill to understand and express literal meaning of utterances),
- sociolinguistic (appropriateness of meaning and form),
- discourse (cohesion and coherence – typically structuralist/formalistic sense), and
- strategic (verbal and non-verbal communication strategies).

1.3.3. The concept of language

Language is a dynamic process used to present either semantic or pragmatic meanings (in linguistics, we can also talk about the meaning that derives from syntax whether on sentence/inter-sentential/language-above-the-sentence level) for the simple reason that the analysis of discourse is, according to G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 1), “necessarily, the analysis of language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which those forms are designed to serve in human affairs”. It (i.e. the notion of language) is captured by W. Chafe (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 673) with the metaphor of a flowing stream. There are, as a matter of fact, two streams; each with very different qualities – a stream of thoughts and a stream of sounds:

[i]t is instructive to compare the experience of listening to a familiar language with listening to a language one does not know. In the former case it is the thoughts, not the sounds, of which one is conscious, but in the latter case only the sounds. Sounds are easier for an analyst to deal with, simply because they are publicly observable. Thoughts are experienced within the mind, and for that reason are less tractable to objective research. On the other hand thoughts enjoy a priority over sounds in the sense that the organization and communication of thoughts is what language is all about. The sounds exist in the service of the thoughts, and follow whenever the thoughts may take them. It is the thoughts that drive language forward. A basic challenge for discourse analysis is to identify the forces that give direction to the flow of thoughts.

M. A. K. Halliday (1976) expresses the viewpoint that language always serves three overarching functions: ideational (representing people, objects, events and states of affairs in the world), interpersonal (expressing the writer’s/speaker’s attitude to such representations) and textual (arraying the above in a cohesive and appropriate manner). As already indicated in the previous course of this study and accurately grasped by P. Riley (1985: 1) discourse analysis is characterised as “a process whereby we create, negotiate and interpret personal meanings”, and it is also a process whereby we study the relation between language (in its both spoken and written form) within some context.

For one thing language is perceived by J. Blommaert (2007: 13) as “a collection of varieties” and for another thing, by E. Hatch (2001: 1), “as a system of arbitrary symbols used for human communication”. Construed to be an external expression of our internal thoughts, this truly “structured social, cognitive, and linguistic enterprise” as E. Hatch (2001: 292) further defines it, is used whenever a need to realise discourse meaning occurs in the continuous and changing contexts of our daily life, the most important of which is the communication of information.

Sometimes, though, it might happen that a particular instance of language produced has no information content at all but is merely used to keep the channels of communication open. This phenomenon is termed phatic communion. G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 3) provide such an instance of it:
[w]hen two strangers are standing shivering at a bus-stop in an icy wind and one turns to the other and says ‘My goodness, it’s cold’, it is difficult to suppose that the primary intention of the speaker is to convey information. It seems much more reasonable to suggest that the speaker is indicating a readiness to be friendly and to talk.

Indeed, the value of the use of language embedded in our cultural mythology, the authors (2007: 2) say, “has enabled the human race to develop diverse cultures, each with its distinctive social customs, religious observances, laws, oral traditions, patterns of trading and so on”. At times, its interpretation can diverge from what their producer has intended; the major reason being different repertoires.

In fact, people only produce language when given such an opportunity with interpersonal use of language prevailing over primarily transactional one (G. Brown/G. Yule 2007), and, it needs to be emphasised, the linguistic resources possessed do differ as there are no two human beings able to refer to such resources in the same manner even if they are inhabitants of the same country, born and bred and able to speak or write the same language at the same or near-the-same level of proficiency. In addition to that, it is the same repertoire that might be blamed once misunderstandings between communicating parties occur. J. Blommaert (2007: 13) thinks they “allow people to deploy certain linguistic resources more or less appropriately in certain contexts”.

Sapir and Whorf (in B. Johnstone 2008a: 43), the authors of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, that is the notion that each language, because of its linguistic uniqueness, creates its own cognitive world, exploring the relation between language and world-view which can enable readers to see the world described in different ways, claim that the categories of language (that categorise things grammatically) can influence (but do not necessarily determine) the way people construe the world. The three key terms in the formulation of the index hypothesis, listed by both Sapir and Whorf (and reminded by B. Johnstone 2008a), are: “‘language,’ ‘thought,’ and ‘reality’”.

The concept of language cannot, though, be used synonymously with regard to other linguistic concepts such as linguistic competence, language system, grammar, grammatical system, communicative system or communication tool, M. Olpińska-Szkielko (2013b: 13) remarks.

But, sometimes, certain linguistic resources and language categories are deployed deliberately in certain contexts. Sounds like the right time to introduce yet another term: that of critical discourse analysis (CDA).

1.4. Critical discourse analysis

When it comes to the definition of critical discourse analysis, T. A. Van Dijk (2001) characterizes it as a territory mapped by both linguistic and sociocultural analysis (adding it has nothing to do with cognition though). J. Blommaert (2007) sees its connection with theories of power and ideology and overcoming structuralist
determinism while R. Wodak (1997: 173), to take a different example, reports it to study “real, and often extended, instances of social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed.”

Being a branch of linguistics, it is recognized by V. K. Bhatia/ J. Flowerdew/ R. H. Jones (2008) as one of the seven major discourse analytical approaches concerned with highlighting the traces of cultural and ideological meaning in spoken and written texts. The other six discourse analytical approaches explored by the above mentioned authors (2008) are: conversation analysis, ethnographic approaches to discourse analysis, corpus-based discourse analysis, multimodal discourse analysis, genre analysis and, the newest approach with the history of just about a decade (focusing though more on social actions than discourse) – mediated discourse analysis.

N. Fairclough’s Language and Power (1989), commonly considered the landmark publication marking the beginning of critical discourse analysis, provides its readers with explicitly politicised analysis of influential, at that time, discourses in Britain (be they Thatcherite political rhetoric and “new economy advertisements”, J. Blommaert 2007). Exercising power “as they transport knowledge on which the collective and individual consciousness feeds. This emerging knowledge is the basis of individual and collective action and the formative action that shapes reality”, S. Jäger writes (2001: 38).

Its antecedents are said to be found in critical linguistics – a movement developed by R. Fowler at the University of East Anglia much earlier: during the 1970s. As N. Fairclough (1995) and R. Wodak (1997) indicate, critical linguistics might be considered a branch of CDA.

Critical discourse analysis is focused on the use of language for the exercise of socio-political power, or more specifically, the social power and cultural domination of both groups and institutions alike. It has nothing to do though with the concept of capillary power described by J. Blommaert (2007) which is perceived as an act of deference and recognition of the social status differences between the speaker and their interlocutor.

Discourse analysis T. A. Van Dijk says (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 354) features “such notions as ‘power,’ ‘dominance,’ ‘hegemony,’ ‘ideology,’ ‘class,’ ‘gender,’ ‘race,’ ‘discrimination,’ ‘interests,’ ‘reproduction,’ ‘institutions,’ ‘social structure,’ and ‘social order,’ besides the more familiar discourse analytical notions”. Most of the notions in question, if not all, belong to the macrolevel of analysis of the social order – also called discourse patterning (as opposed to the microlevel of analysis primarily concerned with the concepts like: language use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication, for instance). But, critical discourse analysis itself, T. A. Van Dijk (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 352) claims “is not so much a direction, school, or specialization next to the many other ‘approaches’ in discourse studies. Rather, it aims to offer a different ‘mode’ or ‘perspective’ of theorizing, analysis, and application throughout the whole field.”
1.4.1. Critical discourse analysis as a social phenomenon

As it has already been noted throughout the course of the present study, the task that CDA sets itself to discover is the role of discourse – an instrument of power in both its spoken and written formats, in the production and reproduction of power abuse and/or domination. In order to resolve all the social problems – be they, for example: social changes, power abuse, ideological imposition or social injustice and, so, effectively realise its aims, critical research on discourse needs to satisfy a number of requirements. Those considered by T. A. Van Dijk (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 353) are:

[a]s is often the case for more marginal research traditions, CDA research has to be ‘better’ than other research in order to be accepted. Empirically adequate critical analysis of social problems is usually multidisciplinary. Rather than merely describe discourse structures, it tries to explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure. More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.

N. Fairclough (1995: 101) claims that there is a tendency nowadays towards conversationalization of discourse (making use, for instance, of terms of reference either increasing or decreasing deference or respect for people of a higher status) which, as a consequence, reduces any asymmetry existing between people of unequal institutional powers such as: teachers and pupils, employers and workers, parents and children, doctors and patients etc., and which:

[e]ntails greater informality, and interactions which have a person-to-person quality in contrast with the interaction between roles or statuses which characterizes more traditional institutional discourse. It also entails more democratic interaction, with a greater sharing of control and a reduction of the asymmetries which mark, say, conventional doctor-patient interaction. Conversationalization can (...) be seen as a discursive part of social and cultural changes associated at some levels at least with increased openness and democracy, in relations between professionals and clients for instance, and greater individualism.

To sum up this part, critical discourse analysis conceives discourse as a social phenomenon which is, first and foremost, concerned with the study of the social relations in contemporary societies. But “power is also negotiable”, B. Johnstone (2008a: 130) makes a remark and, by doing so, she contributes to promoting democratization of discourse.

As we shall be able to see in the subsequent chapter, and what has been noted by N. Fairclough (1995: 79), discourse democratization might also occur in a classroom where teachers “exercise control in discourse with pupils less through direct orders and overt constraints on their right to speak than through indirect requests and suggestions and the way they react and respond (facially and physically as well as verbally) to pupils’ contributions”.
The way social groups are constituted (defined spatially or by a language variety) can be seen through the lens of speech communities, discourse communities or communities of practice. These are the groups of people brought together by a common interest and mutual engagement, who all share both linguistic resources and rules for interaction and interpretation, and acting in accordance with L. Beebe/H. Giles’ (1984) accommodation theory. The theory posits sociocultural distance between the learner’s own group (ingroup) and the target language community group (outgroup). In other words: non-native speakers predisposed positively towards the target language community tend to follow the target language forms used by their native speaker interlocutors subconsciously whereas those predisposed negatively – do not. The latter are, as a result, the main foci of attention of the ethnographers of speaking (concerned, in turn, not with the language structure but with competent language use).

Strictly connected with the concepts discussed is the idea of stance, or stancetaking, defined by B. Johnstone (2008a: 137) as “the methods, linguistic and other, by which interactants create and signal relationships with the propositions they give voice to and the people they interact with”. Recurring sets of stancetaking moves can become repertoires or styles, associated with situations or social identities.

Styles, in turn, associated with a particular set of contextual factors are sometimes called registers (both these notions: repertoire and register have already been introduced in the so far analysis). People can also use other ways to show which set of social alignments is relevant for them at the moment and, thus, create new sets of alignments, which refer to the cover term indexicality. Indexicality is a linguistic form or action contributing to the denotational (literal) meaning helping establish the social meaning; particular strategies applied, it is worth noting, are sometimes called indexes, indices, indexical forms or indexicals (B. Johnstone 2008a).

As a study of this kind, critical discourse analysis needs to be carried out in some stages: progression from description followed by interpretation to explanation (N. Fairclough 1995) or interpretation and explanation (K. O’Halloran 2003); along similar lines, T. A. Van Dijk’s viewpoint (2008) is that any explanation of social interaction properties takes place prior to them being described.

Whether double or threefold, however, N. Fairclough (2003: 14-15) claims, no text analysis should be treated as either complete or definitive. In fact, he describes it as being, at times, selective or subjective as different individuals pay attention to different aspects of texts:

[i]n any analysis, we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts, and not other possible questions (...). There is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst.

G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 12) continue in a similar mode that for any text perception and interpretation there are:
Two hedges required: the representation of a text which is presented for discussion may in part, particularly where the written representation of a spoken text is involved, consist of a prior analysis (hence interpretation) of a fragment of discourse by the discourse analyst presenting the text for consideration and features of the original production of the language, for example shaky handwriting or quavering speech, are somewhat arbitrarily considered as features of the text rather than features of the context in which the language is produced.

But CDA practitioners, seeking to describe regularities in the linguistic realisations used by people to communicate their meanings and intentions, are, on the other hand, specialists in their own fields with the range of their interests (be they applied topics or social domains) varying enormously, and who do not necessarily rely on default elements only. Indeed, the linguistic material they analyse (be it during real time observations and/or later perusal of transcriptions) consists of actual instances of discourse (referred to sometimes as texts) or, in case of non-written discourse, appropriate records of study (these, in turn, may be in the form of printouts or screenshots or transcripts of audio- or videorecordings).

Whatever the form, linguists do often make use of their own self-reports, too although it is transcripts now that contain detailed information on such relevant features as turn-taking, overlapping talk, pauses as well as other significant (including non-verbal) behaviour.

1.4.2. Multidisciplinary critical discourse analysis and forms of spoken interaction

Following T. A. Van Dijk’s (2008) claim that CDA be multidisciplinary, its relationship with adjacent areas of study like linguistics, sociolinguistics, sociology and other social sciences is more than clear. As a matter of fact, it is one of the defining characteristics of discourse and critical discourse studies alike that they are capable of application in a wide variety of settings and contexts.

One of such settings or contexts might be any social institution (institution, not an organisation) which represents, according to Ch. Linde (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 519), “any social group which has a continued existence over time, whatever its degree of reification or formal status may be. Thus, an institution may be a nation, a corporation, the practice of medicine, a family, a gang, a regular Tuesday night poker game, or the class of 75”. N. Fairclough (1995: 38), in turn, perceives an institution as

an apparatus of verbal interaction, or an ‘order of discourse’. (...) Each institution has its own set of speech events, its own differentiated settings and scenes, its cast of participants, and its own norms for its combination – for which members of the cast may participate in which speech events, playing which parts, in which settings, in the pursuit of which topics or goals, for which institutionally recognized purposes.
As a result, we can talk about such broad terms and approaches as: political discourse, discourse and racism, media language, medical discourse, genre, child discourse, male-female communication, computer-mediated discourse or discourse in education settings all seeking out the ways, as one of their core goals, in which language choice is manipulated for specific effects; needless to say, the above list is by no way exhaustive and serves to provide just a few examples of discourse relationships with other areas of study:

a) political discourse

J. Wilson (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 404), in a similar vein to B. Johnstone (2008a: 54) who claims that “[w]ays of talking produce and reproduce ways of thinking, and ways of thinking can be manipulated via choices about grammar, style, wording, and every other aspect of discourse”, takes note of a coordinating conjunction (coordinator) and used for either planned or unplanned coordination (the former as in X, Y, and Z while the latter as in X and Y and Z).

Making a reference to political terms, he says that “unplanned coordination is used where one wishes the elements to be treated independently (Scotland and England and Wales and Northern Ireland), whereas planned coordination treats the elements as naturally linked (Scotland, England, Wales, and Northern Ireland)”; a difference certainly not to be missed by nationalist-oriented movements followers.

b) discourse and racism

Discourse and racism, together with its beliefs and opinions, is thought to be produced and reproduced by means of discourse which, as proclaimed by R. Wodak and M. Reisigl in the publication under the same title (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 372), “serves to criticize, delegitimate, and argue against racist opinions and practices, that is, to pursue antiracist strategies”.

In case of Britain, for instance, such opinions and practices are embodied in the ideology (and political activities) of the British National Front (commonly known as the National Front, or, the NF) propagated during the 1970s and 1980s.

c) media language

Media language is compared by N. Fairclough (1995) to synthetic personalisation and is transmitted to the public in the form of all sorts of genres via radio, internet, newspapers or television. As C. Cotter (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 430) puts it:

[w]e play the radio when we drive to work, and hear it at the office. We check on-line news sites for everything from stock quotes to movie listings to the latest breaking news. We get the world in a glance from rows of news racks or over the shoulder of someone reading a paper. The television’s steady stream of talk is often a counterpoint to social visits, household activities, and dinnertime conversation, not to mention its other position as social focal point.

d) medical discourse

Medical discourse is concentrated really in two areas: doctor-patient communication where the focus is on spoken discourse and the language of particular genres; the latter stands for, yet, another example of multidisciplinary CDA.
e) genre

It is a culturally and linguistically distinct form of discourse which, together with rhetorical format, helps create text coherence. At the most general level, we distinguish between narrative genre (thought to be the most universal genre as all cultures have storytelling traditions structured around a chronological development of events, and centred around a person or hero), and factual or expository writing (no chronological organization but, rather, a logical one, and usually objective and factual in nature). M. McCarthy/ R. Carter (1994) refer to these as the two prototype genres.

In his model of normal narratives (personal experience narrative, to be more precise) W. Labov (1972), drawing on W. Labov/ J. Waletzky (1967), specifies a list of most commonly found elements (obviously, not all stories have them all):

- abstract (short statements of what the story is going to be about),
- orientation (setting out the time, place and characters for the reader or listener),
- complicating action (the main events that make the story happen – its climax),
- result or resolution (informing how the events sort themselves out),
- coda (providing a bridge between the story world and the moment of telling or a short summary).

One more component, which recapitulates what makes the story worth listening to or reading, might be added to the list: evaluation.

W. Chafe (2008), in turn, to give another example, in his schema for the narrative topic development lists the following components:

- opening summary (may or may not be present),
- initial state (providing a spatiotemporal and/or epistemic orientation),
- complication (events that lead to a climax),
- climax (the point of the topic),
- denouement (relaxation),
- final state (incorporating new knowledge provided by the climax),
- coda (metacomment on the topic as a whole; similarly to opening summary, may or may not be present).

f) child discourse and male-female communication

Different activity practices of girls’ and boys’ lead them to developing different genres of speech and different skills for doing things with words – as J. Cook-Gumperz/ A. Kyratzis (in D. Schiffrin et al. 2008: 604) state: “[g]irls’ talk is collaboration-oriented and boys’ talk is competition-oriented”.

Unfortunately, those ways of speaking, learnt while growing up, are not without any significance in an all adult world at a later stage; indeed male-female communication in contemporary society, D. Tannen (1990: 131) admits, constitutes “cross-cultural communication”, which can often result in miscommunication, too.

Said that, C. O. Houle (1972 in: R. Grupa 2013a) makes a point that education is one of the most basic human processes and, in spite of the fact that there are differences between both children and adults, any educational activities directed at
adult females and males are, in principle, similar to those of male and female young (teenage) learners.

**g) computer-mediated discourse**

Computer-mediated discourse (or CMD) and the communication produced when human beings (in fact: members of virtual communities of practice) interact with one another by transmitting messages via networked computers (messages are typed on a computer keyboard and read on a computer screen typically by a person or persons at a different location from the message sender) can be added to this list alike.

Depending on whether the users are logged on at the same time in order to send and receive messages or whether those messages are stored for their later perusal, we can talk about synchronous and asynchronous CMD, respectively (S. C. Herring 2008).

One area in need of particular attention in this respect is that of distance education (open and distance education); it has a history of over one hundred years (including different methods of teaching). Drawing on M. G. Moore/ G. Kearsley’s (1996) definition associating it with “planned learning”, R. Grupa (2013b) reconfirms that this type of education is open for everybody and its aim is to cater for learners’ special requirements resulting from their education needs. Mindful of that, R. Grupa (2013b) reminds us that initial systems of on-line education have been centred upon students’ work only with the interaction with the teacher being almost none.

It is thanks to the development of modern technologies (communication tools) that the student(s)-teacher, teacher-student(s) or student(s)-student(s) communication becomes possible. Such two-dimensional (social) communication is emphasized by Keegan (1996), M. H. Onken/ S. Garrison (1998), J. S. Bruner (1999) or P. Jamieson (1999) all of whom, apart from technology, stress the important role of teacher, which, in turn, is the key element of constructivist education (R. Grupa 2013b).

Finally, R. Grupa, (2013b) writes that the development of Internet(-based) education (the use of both synchronous, for instance text chat or video-conferences and asynchronous: emails or discussion forums communication tools) has prevented students from virtual isolation.

**h) discourse in education settings**

Last but by no means least, there is discourse in education settings (pedagogic context) to a great extent “woven of linguistic interaction” (C. Temple Adger 2008: 503) although, it should be noted, traditional sociolinguistic researchers used to doubt whether pedagogic discourse be treated as a specific (i.e. distinct kind of) discourse at all.

That said, R. Nunn (1999) comes up with his tripartite division of pedagogic discourse levels where level 1 implies discourse management function determined by classroom roles, level 2 transgresses the context of the classroom and level 3 compares itself with the discourse of content-area instruction.

As for the forms of spoken interaction, the main functions of these are informing, regulating, and persuading. Their examples include not only “everyday
conversations between friends and acquaintances, but also interactions in medical, educational, mass media and socio-legal contexts, relatively ‘monologic’ interactions such as lecturing, or speech-making, and technologically complex interactions such as web-based multiparty communication” (P. Drew/ T. Curl 2008: 22).

In the subsequent chapter, attention is turned towards conversation analysis: a field of study concerned with the norms, practises and competencies underlying the organization of social interaction and frequently equated with discourse analysis. As J. Cutting (2008: 26) notices, it differs, however, from the latter in methodology – that is “whereas discourse analysis takes the concepts and terms of linguistics and then examines their role in real data, conversation analysis takes real data and then examines the language and demonstrates that conversation is systematically structured”. Its guiding principle asks of every single utterance in any conversation the question: “[w]hy that now?” (M. Nevile 2008: 4). That, in M. Coulthard’s (1977: 76) version (he follows Sacks’ *Mimeo lecture notes*, 1971) reads: “[w]hy that now and to me?”
2. Conversation analysis, speech acts and speech act theory

2.1. Conversation analysis

The term conversation analysis (CA) is first developed in the mid 1960s by H. Sacks and refers to a particular theory and method for the analysis of everyday oral interactions; within American tradition, M. McCarthy (2006) admits, it can be included under the general heading of discourse analysis.

Conversation analysis is a qualitative not a quantitative approach which, according to J. Cutting (2008: 26), “looks at conversation as a linear, ongoing event that unfolds little by little and implies the negotiation of cooperation between speakers along the way, thus viewing conversation as a process”. It is founded on a sociological conceptualization of the basically social nature of language use in human interaction and stands for a method for uncovering what is assumed to be unobservable systems for social order: unobservable or unknown, or both. Indeed, as P. Drew/ T. Curl (2008: 22-23) say:

[...]the central sociological insight of CA is that it is through conversation that we conduct the ordinary, and perhaps extraordinary, affairs of our lives. When people talk with one another, they are not merely communicating thoughts, information or knowledge. Our relationships with one another, and our sense of who we are to one another, are generated, manifest, maintained and managed in and through our conversations, whether face-to-face or on the telephone. People construct, establish, reproduce and negotiate their identities, roles and relationships in conversational interaction. In our interactions with others, we don’t just talk; conversation is not, to adapt Wittgenstein’s phrase, ‘language idling’.

In the further course of this study, I shall yet pay attention towards the concept of classroom discourse but, talking about conversation analysis now, it would be worth noting S. Walsh’ (2006) standpoint on that. Probing the main features of CA approach (to analysing L2 classroom interaction), S. Walsh (2006: 52) reports that

[...]first of all, unlike interaction analysis (IA) and DA approaches, there is no preconceived set of descriptive categories at the outset. The aim of CA is to account for the structural organization of the interaction as determined by the participants.

2.1.1. Conversational turn-taking

Before shifting attention towards J. L. Austin’s (1976) speech act theory, the underpinnings of which appear in the above mentioned quotation, it would be worth stopping for a while in order to think about some general characteristics of
conversation itself whose syntax is typically much less structured than that of the written language.

H. Sacks/ E. A. Schegloff/ G. Jefferson (1974), in their model of conversational turn-taking, list fourteen “grossly apparent” facts about conversation. But conversation, P. Riley (1985) makes a remark, which is co-constructed by participants who function as social equals (the Chomskyan paradigm), is not accurate in order to fully understand the dynamics of discourse. In any case, these facts must be accounted for in any model of how conversation works and, among other things, include speaker change – which, M. Coulthard (1985: 61) claims, “takes place at the end of sentences” – but also occurrences, transitions, turns (order, size and distribution), conversation length, parties involved or repair mechanisms. Coming back to H. Sacks/ E. A. Schegloff/ G. Jefferson’s (1974) findings – they take the following facts into account:

- Speaker change recurs, or at least occurs.
- Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
- Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief.
- Transitions (from one turn to the next) with no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions.
- Turn order is not fixed, but varies.
- Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
- Length of conversation is not specified in advance.
- What parties say is not specified in advance.
- Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance.
- Number of parties can vary.
- Talk can be continuous or discontinuous.
- Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may select a next speaker (as when he or she addresses a question to another party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk.
- Various ‘turn-constructional units’ are employed; e.g., turns can be one word long or they can be the length of a sentence.
- Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble.

From the above speech exchange system model (the organization of turn-taking), we can judge that with two or more people starting to talk at the same time (self-selection technique), usually the first to start, or, grab the floor, is allowed to continue with other speaker or speakers eventually dropping out. Indeed, a very common type of overlapping (simultaneous) talk occurs when one participant starts talking just as the other speaker comes to a recognizably possible end of their turn as if predicting each other’s utterances. Another way in which turns get allocated is when the person who is talking selects the one who gets the right to talk next, for example by asking them a question or by using a contextualization cue
(a metacommunicative function such as pause, final intonation or discourse markers signalling the potential end of a turn).

It needs to be stressed, however, that there is a very low tolerance of silence between turns (on average less than one second; that is especially the case in a socialising phase when the group has to talk about something), and if the intended next speaker does not begin at once the previous speaker is likely to produce a post completer. J. Cutting (2008: 28) expresses the viewpoint that

> [e]ach culture seems to have an unwritten agreement about the acceptable length of a pause between two turns. In any culture, if the pause is intended to carry meaning, analysts call it an attributable silence

while J. Blommaert (2007), on the other hand, assumes that dialogicity (specifically) presumes neither co-operativity nor sharedness – not to mention the third item on his list which is symmetry in contextualising power.

Most kinds of genres involve turn taking; there are others, however, named single-turn genres (speeches and sermons, for instance) that do not.

### 2.1.2. Adjacency pairs

Depending on the circumstances, speakers can get attuned to conventions about adjacency pairs (H. Sacks et al. 1974) which stand for basic structural units of two utterances long, mutually dependent and used for opening and closing conversations (the sequences of adjacency pairs build up a topic).

V. K. Bhatia et al. (2008: 5) describe the concept in question as “not just linguistically related but ‘socially’ related because they accomplish particular social actions. The ways utterances (and the actions they accomplish) are put together sequentially follow rules of conditional relevance, each utterance displaying a particular understanding of the previous utterance and creating the conditions for subsequent utterances”. Indeed, they have a structure of a related pair consisting of two components produced successively by speakers in a strict order: the first pair-part, setting up a transition relevance/transition relevance place, TRP (E. A. Schegloff/H. Sacks et. al. 1974) predicts the occurrence of the second pair-part. This is normally the case in any questions (question-answer), complaints (blame-deny), offers (offer-acceptance/denial), et cetera. At the same time, any lack of answer, it is worth noting, is generally treated by the other party concerned as a deliberate refusal to participate in the ongoing conversation.

When speakers do not want to wait until transition relevance places occur, this is called interruption (it stands in total opposition to overlap). According to E. Hatch (2001: 66), “interrupting in order to gain a turn demonstrates a lack of power”.

Some first pair-parts allow for alternative seconds – invitations, to give an example, naturally prefer acceptances over dispreferred rejections which can be perceived as rude; polite refusals of invitations can be further segmented into: appreciation, softener, reason or face-saver. On that basis, a distinction between preferred (structurally simple or unmarked) and dispreferred (structurally complex
or marked) options, commonly known as the preference structure, is introduced (S. C. Levinson 1983).

Adjacency pairs might sometimes be disrupted by an insertion sequence (embedded pair or pairs acting as macro-sequences and occurring inside each other), which delays the answer-part to one question-part of a pair until another answer to a different question is provided. It is different from a side sequence which begins with a questioning repeat: an interrogative item indicating that there is a problem in what has just been said. At times, pre-sequences preparing the ground for a further sequence and signalling the type of utterance to follow might be expressed; with the conversation resuming, after an insertion sequence, a return problem can emerge. That, according to G. Jefferson (in H. Sacks et al. 1974), can only be effected either as a resumption (achieved by attention getters such as listen or hey you know) or as a continuation (attempted by so or and).

2.1.3. The role of phonology in conversation analysis

Phonology, the linguistic study of sound systems which gives us different types of information that is helpful for better understanding what spoken discourse sounds like, plays a vital role in conversation analysis (and communicative competence), too.

Slowing of tempo (the speed of speech), vowel elongation or falling intonation, for instance, all help to signal the end of a turn and according to what G. Ward/B. J. Birner (2008: 119) say: “[i]n addition to deciding what to say, speakers must decide how to say it”. Much of this information comes from prosody – the suprasegmental system made up of intonation, stress, rhythm and pitch (prosody performs both bottom-up and top-down processing functions); the segmental system, in contrast, refers to individual vowel and consonant sounds as well as their distribution.

D. Le M. Bolinger (1986) compares regular length for both stressed and unstressed syllables and, on the basis of his findings, makes a distinction between stress-timed (or unbounded, e.g. English or Arabic) and syllable-timed (or bounded, e.g. French, Spanish or Japanese) languages. As for the first (they can also follow either trochaic, that is strong-weak, or iambic, that is weak-strong, rhythm), stress is located at fixed distances from the boundaries of words whereas, as for the latter, the main stress is pulled towards any utterance’s focal syllable.

In addition to that, languages can be classified as either tone or intonation ones. When it comes to those first, it is, namely, their pitch that applies lexically to distinguish words as in the case of, for instance, some Asian languages like Chinese, Thai, Vietnamese or African languages such as Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa. The latter, in turn, apply pitch patterns to entire utterances with the examples being European and Middle Eastern languages such as Hebrew, Arabic, Japanese, Korean, German, English, French, Russian or Spanish (M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain 2007).

In the next chapter I shall delve into classroom discourse seen from the perspective of foreign and second language teaching and learning. Just for that reason it would be worth repeating now after M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007:
33) that “[i]n general, if learners speak an intonation language as their first language, it is assumed they will learn the intonation of another language more easily than will someone who speaks a tone language as their first language, or vice versa.”

As for intonation, however, one of its functions, according to the Prague School representatives, is to mark off in English which information the speaker is treating as new (new or contrastive information is emphasised indeed) and which information the speaker is treating as given (given or noncontroversial information is, in turn, de-emphasised) although as G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 168), following M. A. K. Halliday (1976), maintain:

> [i]t is not the structure of discourse which determines whether information is treated by the speaker as new, and marked with phonological prominence, or treated by the speaker as given, and not marked with phonological prominence. It is, on the contrary, the speaker’s moment-to-moment assessment of the relationship between what he wants to say and his hearer’s informational requirements.

Also, at times, one may find that the punctuation of written English reflects intonation of spoken English but for V. F. Allen (1971) who suggests otherwise – viz. that punctuation is not a completely reliable guide to intonation.

D. Brazil (1985), drawing on the work of G. Brown/ K. L. Currie/ J. Kenworthy (1980), makes a suggestion that as far as intonation is concerned, one can talk about its four different sets of options:

- prominence (marked by some variation in pitch, either predominantly rising or falling; prominence is, thus, not the same as word stress that words bear in themselves),
- tone (there are five tone types: fall, rise-fall, fall-rise, rise, level; e.g. fall-rise tone is called a referring tone while the falling tone – proclaiming),
- key (a three-term pitch system: high for contrastiveness, mid for addition and low for reiteration),
- termination (that is matching or concord in pitch between speakers).

The above options are all associated with the notion of tone unit; other descriptions call units of the same general size breath groups, phonemic clauses or tone groups although G. Brown/ G. Yule (1983) prefer to work with paratones (pause-defined units relating to topic and not information structure). Tone unit is a stretch of speech initiated by a silent ictus (comparable to a silent beat in music) and consisting of one tonic syllable characterised as having the maximum (prominent) unit of pitch (nucleus) on it, and whose structure is strictly in this order: a proclitic, tonic and enclitic segment. In other descriptions tonic syllable is also called nuclear syllable or sentence stress and is characterised as having maximal moving pitch, maximal pitch height, maximal intensity and/or maximal duration.

Apart from tonic syllable, there can be one or more other syllables that trail off from it, and G. Brown/ G. Yule (2007: 165) remind that

> many scholars working on intonation, particularly those working on intonation in conversational speech, have abandoned (...) the requirement that information units, however realised, should contain only one focus, hence be realised with only one tonic.
As a rule, in unmarked utterances of the English language (otherwise both message and context need to be observed), nouns, adjectives, main verbs and, sometimes, adverbs (that is those words which typically convey core propositional information) are stressed whereas articles, prepositions, personal and relative pronouns, auxiliary verbs and conjunctions (such words that carry grammatical information) are most likely unstressed (G. Brown/G. Yule 2007).

2.1.4. The cooperative principle

Speakers, threatened with the possibility of their interlocutor taking a turn, typically repeat themselves or, rather, reiterate the same syntactic structure or a lexical item (although the process of relexicalisation can also be used towards topic development, and the modification, and reworking of lexical items used in already ongoing conversation). They may well use fillers or recycle (return to the beginning of) their utterance, too. M. Coulthard (1985: 61) claims that “there is no mechanism in conversation by which the current speaker can select the next-but-one speaker – choice of the next speaker is always the prerogative of the current speaker if he chooses to exercise”.

H. Sacks (1974) admits that speakers can also be concerned with points of possible completion. These are overridden, however, by utterance incompletor technique when, by using clause connectors or incompletion markers, a potentially complete sentence is turned into an incomplete one. H. G. Widdowson (2007: 56) maintains that providing both parties “recognize the purpose for which they are communicating in the first place”, H. P. Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle: “[m]ake your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”, expressed in the form of four maxims, applies.

The maxims of quantity relate to the least effort principle and support the argument that we only use as much language as we need to make the required contextual connection:

- “[m]ake your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange”, and
- “[d]o not make your contribution more informative than is required”.

Being truthful is expressed in the two maxims of quality:

- “[d]o not say what you believe to be false”, and
- “[d]o not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”.

Next is the maxim of relation (or relevance) with the simple assumption:

- “[b]e relevant”.

And, finally, the Gricean maxims of manner (similar in form to what D. H. Hymes refers to as feasibility) which advise to:

- “[a]void obscurity of expression”,
- “[a]void ambiguity”,
- “[b]e brief”, and
- “[b]e orderly”.


All the maxims serve as guidance and describe rational means for conducting co-operative exchanges. As a matter of fact, in most cases, human beings want to communicate with each other successfully and maintain social harmony while doing so. They (i.e. the index maxims) are enriched by G. Leech’ politeness principle (1983), the main assumption of which is to minimize unfavourable behaviour towards the hearer or a third party while attempting to increase favourable consequences. G. Leech (1983) proposes a cost-benefit scale – i.e. when the speaker is impolite, there is a higher cost for the hearer and, conversely, the more polite the speaker, the greater the benefit for the hearer.

When it comes to the principle of relevance of D. Sperber/ D. Wilson (1995), every act of ostensive communication (that is any act of deliberate, overt communication in which the speaker not only intends to convey a particular message but is also actively helping the hearer recognize this) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance. The four maxims can subsequently be reduced to the maxim of relation since relevance, governed by contextual effects and processing effort, is considered a natural feature of all exchanges in which speakers aim to achieve successful (and not random) communication. By contextual effects I mean the ways in which a new piece of information may interact with contextual assumptions to yield an improvement to the hearer’s overall representation of the world while processing effort stands for the function associated mainly with not only linguistic complexity of utterance but also with the cost of accessing and using contextual assumptions in the derivation of contextual effects.

Finally, the maxim of quantity can be expressed as the right amount of relevant information without hogging the floor (unless special permission is granted), the maxim of quality as sincere relevant information that one believes is true, and the maxim of manner as unambiguous relevant information constructed in an orderly way (D. Sperber/ D. Wilson 1995).

2.1.5. Flouting the maxims

The above described steps are more than likely to deprive speakers of their individuality for the simple reason that “it is not just meaning that is negotiated in communication but human relations. P1 and P2 are not just parties seeking an impartial agreement about shared knowledge but individual personalities competing to establish their own position in the area of convergence” (H. G. Widdowson 2007: 64).

 Needless to say, when communication takes place between two interactants who do not share the same language or the same culture (different cultures, countries and communities might have their own ways of observing and expressing maxims for particular situations), unintended violations of the maxims can easily occur – when speakers appear not to follow the maxims, we can say that they are flouting them. The main ways of flouting the maxims (sometimes there might also be an overlap between all four of them) are by using well-established exaggerating expressions (discourse-specific lexical/instantial relations): hyperboles, metaphors, conventional
euphemisms, irony or sarcasm and banter. Such instances of noncooperative communication are sometimes referred to as crosstalk; H. P. Grice (1975) lists two other ways to fail to fulfil any of the maxims (to infringe and to opt out). Speakers infringing any of the maxims fail to observe them because of their imperfect linguistic performance while by opting out they indicate their unwillingness to cooperate (although, at times, they might not want to appear uncooperative). J. Thomas (1995), with regard to the former, provides such reasons as imperfect command of the language (child, foreign learner), impaired performance (nervousness, drunkenness, excitement), cognitive impairment or incapability of speaking clearly and including under the heading of the latter: legal or ethical reasons.

2.1.6. Universal constraints and culture-specific conventions

In all communication types (and, therefore, all languages), there is a set of universal constraints (E. Goffman 1976) further divided into: system constraints (the components required for all communication systems) and ritual constraints (the social constraints that smooth social interaction).

There are eight system constraints in total to which E. Goffman (1976) includes:

- channel open and close signals (the ways to show that communication either begins or ends),
- backchannel signals (the signals that a message is getting through),
- turnover signals (the signals that allow for a smooth exchange of turns sometimes called a transition-relevant place; to get an extended turn to talk, speakers need to obtain permission via a preannouncement called ticket),
- acoustically adequate and interpretable messages (messages need to be both interpretable and hearable),
- bracket signals (the signals showing that parts of the message are not right on-line with the message currently conveyed),
- nonparticipant constraints (the ways of blocking nonparticipant noise from the communication channel),
- preempt signals (the ways for participants to interrupt an ongoing channel message), and (described above)
- the set of Gricean norms for cooperative communication.

And as per ritual constraints, E. Goffman (1976) lists the following components (these are based on system constraints):

- ritual constraints in openings and closings,
- ritual constraints and backchannel signals,
- ritual constraints and turnover signals,
- ritual constraints and acoustically adequate and interpretable messages,
- ritual constraints and bracket signals,
- ritual constraints and nonparticipant signals,
- ritual constraints, and preempt signals and
- ritual constraints and Grice’s maxims.
Once participants wish to indicate to the person being spoken to that they should continue any ongoing talk, this finds its way in backchannel behaviour such as nods or sentence completions. A. Kendon (1967) also suggests that one especially important factor enabling smooth change-over of the speaker is gaze.

In the course of the foregoing analysis, we have seen that interruption pressures are quite common when more than two participants wish to speak at one time (in such circumstances, turns might be typically only one sentence long) whereas in pre-allocated systems no (strong) interruption pressures occur (turns tend, as a result, to be longer and, for this reason, may consist of a series of linked sentences). Obviously, the choice of specific linguistic devices used for getting a turn does vary greatly and it is appropriacy to different situations that plays an important role here.

Lack of restrictions might result in the occurrence of more natural turn-taking habits and dominant speakers or culture-specific conventions that represent different historical, cultural and linguistic experiences (pragmalinguistic or sociopragmatic) can contribute to the rise of possible problems – so called trouble points.

Intercultural or cross-cultural (dealing with various sorts of group boundaries such as national, geographical, ethnic, occupational, class or gender) approach awareness helps choose appropriate kind of language (depending on who is its intended recipient: speakers of the same or another language), as in the context of learning languages. A. Scarino (2009: 68) reports that “communication is at least potentially intercultural, in that it entails students learning to move between two languages and cultures – the students' own languages(s) and culture(s), and the languages and culture(s) they are learning.” That said, J. C. Styszyński (2004: 27) is of the opinion that cultural studies elements ought to be incorporated, from the very beginning, into the process of foreign language teaching for their role is to eliminate any stereotypes and prejudice.

Cross-cultural pragmatics, in turn, contrasts the use of one’s first language (of two or more social groups) while intercultural pragmatics, to give one more example, provides synchronic studies of the second language use (as observed in both non-native versus non-native and non-native versus native speaker environments). To sum up this part, let me quote after J. Cutting (2008: 27) who says that:

> [a]ll cultures have their own preferences as to how long a speaker should hold the floor, how they indicate that they have finished and another speaker can take the floor, when a new speaker can start, whether the new speaker can overlap and interrupt, when speakers can pause and for how long.

In the analysis to come, I shall yet return to culture specific aspects which are the preoccupation of ethnomethodologists. The scope of their work remains in opposition to the scope of work of interpretivists or interactionists who, in turn, are prepared to bring other sources of data to bear on the analysis of interactional data and who, as a matter of fact, see conversation as a joint activity that needs to be worked at what is actually observable.
To continue, however, let me look in more detail at, already indicated in the previous course of this study and equated with pragmatics, speech act theory.

2.2. Speech acts and speech act theory

All speakers in the process of cooperative interaction are able to produce an indefinite number of descriptive sentences despite the existence of a limited set of lexico-grammatical rules (N. Chomsky 1965, 1966).

Lexico-grammatical competence, one needs to be aware, stands for any language user’s knowledge of syntax and lexical semantics in their target language; that is why the rules that account for implicit formal knowledge of grammar and vocabulary have to, in the circumstances of language learning, be presented indeed. In actual fact, grammatical knowledge, as M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007: 50-1) put it:

[i]s somewhat more critical for discourse production, i.e., for writing and speaking than it is for discourse reception, i.e., listening and reading. This is because listening and reading comprehension draw heavily and simultaneously on multiple sources for interpretation including meaning of vocabulary items, content, and formal schemata; situational/contextual information; and knowledge of the world. Grammar thus tends to have a subordinate role for the receptive skills and to be used on an ‘as needed’ basis for resolving problems of interpretation rather than being deployed as a primary resource.

Each one of such utterances, apart from exchanging thoughts and ideas, in saying something per se, might also perform social actions or functions (one specific at a time only). Such social actions are called performative by J. L. Austin (1962, 1976) and are generally referred to as speech acts: a point where “social psychology and linguistic analysis intersect” (R. Harré 2008: 696). One can differentiate between direct and indirect speech acts (the latter, more challenging to interpret, are most often realised by conventionally indirect realisation patterns). R. Harré (2008) further adopts the well-known distinction between “actions (individual intended behaviour) and acts (the jointly constructed social meanings of actions) in distinguishing between speech actions – what someone intends by an utterance – and speech acts – what is jointly accomplished by that utterance in context”.

N. Fairclough (1989: 5) adds to that by saying that the idea of speech acts, “uttering as acting”, is central to what he calls critical language study (CLS) which “analyses social interactions in a way which focuses upon their linguistic elements”. This way of understanding speech acts should not be confused with J. Dore’s (1978) idea of young children’s one-word utterances, however, characterized under the overall heading of primitive speech acts (be they labelling, repeating, answering, requesting: action, requesting: answer, calling, greeting, protesting and practising) since they have no predication but consist simply of a rudimentary referring expression and a primitive force, typically indicated by intonation.
A distinction from a speech event, occurring of necessity in time and space, should be made, too – as M. Coulthard (1985: 42) puts it: “[t]he relationship between speech events and speech acts is hierarchical; an event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several”; what they both do have in common is their purpose, even if phatic (M. Coulthard (1985). J. L. Austin (1976: 26-36) claims that there are four conditions which must be satisfied if any performative act is not to misfire:

- There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.
- The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
- The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly.
- The procedure must be executed by all participants completely.

In other words, J. L. Austin (1976) realises that in order for speech acts to be appropriately and successfully performed, certain felicity conditions have to be met and, thus, what someone says becomes effective only if it is said by the right person in the right circumstances and if it is so understood by the other party involved. Differences in speech act conventions are very much culture bound and can cause communication difficulties interculturally – this is what M. Celce-Murcia/ Z. Dörnyei/ S. Turrell (1995) in their model of communication competence refer to as actional competence. Indeed, “[t]he ways of expressing speech acts vary from social group to social group, country to country, from culture to culture” (J. Cutting 2008: 19).

Speech act theory is the description of what utterances are intended to do (such as promise, apologise or threaten) originating in J. L. Austin’s prior observations that while sentences can often be used to report states of affairs, the utterance of some sentences must, in some specified circumstances, be treated as performance of an act. The doctrine of performative/constative distinction, J. L. Austin (1976: 148) further claims, “stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech-act as the special theory to the general theory. And the need for the general theory arises simply because the traditional ‘statement’ is an abstraction, an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity”.

2.2.1. Locutionary meaning, illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect

Every realisation of any speech act has three dimensions (J. L. Austin 1962): locutionary meaning (based on the meaning of linguistic expression), illocutionary force (the intended meaning) and perlocutionary effect (the effect the act has on its addressee). J. L. Austin (1962) also distinguishes between perlocutionary object (the intended result of illocutionary act) and perlocutionary sequel (unintended or secondary result).

G. Leech (1983), on the other hand, classifies illocutionary functions in terms of how they interact with the goal of achieving social harmony: a) competitive (the
illocutionary goal competes with the social goal), b) convivial (the illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal), c) collaborative (also termed neutral; the illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal) and d) conflictive (the illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal) while H. G. Widdowson (2007: 91) differentiates between: “a) [u]ttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts, b) [r]eferring and predicating = performing propositional acts, c) [s]tating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts”.

2.2.2. Performative verbs and five macro-classes of speech acts

Obviously, in most languages there exist performative verbs (such as inviting, questioning, answering, complaining, expressing resentment, apologizing and so forth) that carry the lexical meaning of particular speech acts and, thus, uttering such verb constitutes performing of some action. J. L. Austin (1962) proposes grouping performative verbs into five major classes: 1) verdictives (typified by giving verdicts by the jury), 2) exercitives (exercising powers, rights or influence), 3) commissives (committing the speaker to doing something), 4) behabitives (concerned with attitudes and social behaviour) and 5) expositives (clarifying how utterances fit into the ongoing discourse or how they are being used).

J. L. Austin (1962) also develops, and soon abandons, the performative hypothesis which says that behind every utterance there is a performative verb that makes the illocutionary force explicit.

J. R. Searle (1969), who sees any utterance as consisting of two parts: a proposition and function indicating device (the latter marks the illocutionary force), classifies speech acts into five macro-classes. First on his list are directives or requests made for someone to stop doing something (such as the imperative/polite imperative). The two are subdivided further by S. M. Ervin-Tripp (1972) into five more types on the grounds of the relationship between the speaker and addressee: personal need or desire statements, imperative, imbedded imperative, permission directive and hint (sometimes containing some humour).

Second on J. R. Searle’s list (1969) come commissives or statements that function as promises or refusals of action. These are followed by representatives – judgements for truth values such as feelings, beliefs or assertions. Then, there are declaratives (also called performatives) that bring about a new state of being and, thus, attempt to change the world. And, last but not least, expressives: psychological statements of joy and disappointment (likes and dislikes).

The two types of rules distinguished by J. R. Searle (1969) and governing the linguistic realisation of illocutionary acts are regulative (concerned with conditions for the occurrence of certain forms of behaviour) and constitutive (define the behaviour itself).

J. R. Searle (1969) makes a distinction between direct speech acts where the speaker wants to communicate the literal meaning of the words expressed and
indirect speech acts where the speaker wants to communicate a different meaning from the apparent surface meaning; as J. Cutting notices (2008: 17): “much of what we say operates on both levels” – with regard to the former “there is a direct relationship between the form and the function” while with regard to the latter “the form and function are not directly related”.

Speech act analysis plays an important role in language teaching. Indeed, it is not long after J. L. Austin (1962) and J. R. Searle (1969) come up with their ideas that the Council of Europe accepts a notational-functional syllabus introduced by J. A. Van Ek (1976) or the notional syllabus proposed by D. A. Wilkins (1976) – both drawing strictly on the work of the first. The above named syllabuses are concerned with language teaching and learning but after a profound speech act analysis a major problem soon arises, grasped by M. Coulthard (1985: 154), of how and if, at all, “it is possible to perform several speech acts simultaneously with an indirect utterance; is it possible to perform several functions simultaneously?”

In my analyses I have laid out some issues concerned with the notion of discourse, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. Such a tripartite design has eventually been extended to the part on the notion of conversation analysis and, then, speech acts and speech act theory, too. The implications drawn, in and of themselves, are of central relevance in the further course of the study where the main focus of attention is classroom discourse or, as J. Majer (2003) also calls it, applied discourse analysis (both speech analysis and language teaching are under study).
3. Classroom discourse in English as a foreign language settings

3.1. English teaching and learning contexts

It is not surprising at all that it is any language classroom (clearly institutionalised, physical environment) where model exchanges between teachers and students, copying authentic interactions, usually take place. But one needs to remember that the language classroom alone is an umbrella term, too broad in its nature, to name, one by one, all the specific settings where such a variety of interaction processes resulting in tutored language learning occurs.

P. Ur (1984) distinguishes two types of authenticity, namely: genuine (unadapted, natural interaction among the native speakers) and imitation (approximation of real speech that takes into account the learners’ level of ability). As he (1984: 23) says, learners learn best “from listening to speech which, while not entirely authentic, is an approximation of the real thing, and is planned to take into account the learners’ level of ability and particular difficulties.”

Talking about the environments where the English language can be learnt, I feel it necessary to refer to B. B. Kachru’s (1985) sociolinguistic model of present-day Englishes and, in this way, move on to another type of A. Duranti/ Ch. Goodwin’s (1992) context classification: extrasituationnal.

Indeed, according to B. B. Kachru (1985), there are six typically monolingual English-speaking states: 1) the United States, 2) the United Kingdom, 3) Canada, 4) Australia, 5) New Zealand and 6) the Republic of Ireland where English is the mother tongue used by the majority of their population on a daily basis. Apart from that, the inhabitants of: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Kenya, the Republic of South Africa, the Philippines, Malaysia or Singapore (the post-colonial states) frequently refer to English in its institutionalised form as their second (auxiliary/intracommunity) language.

Along similar lines, where the role of English is not formally acknowledged, it is still used in the vast majority of fields such as trade or culture, for instance (Kachru does not indicate any place for pidgins or creoles of English, though). Mindful of such a division, there is no doubt that the idea of English pluricentric language, as B. B. Kachru/ C. L. Nelson (1996: 71) put it, and which has “more than one accepted standard and a set of norms for creativity”, wins acclaim as an international (and intranational) language (EIL) or lingua franca (ELF). But, at the same time, no one owns it, D. Crystal (2000) points out.

Bearing these points in mind, H. Komorowska (2006: 111) takes note of a conflict that “can be seen between the pragmatic objective calling for the uniformity of a lingua franca, a medium of communication between people speaking different mother tongues, and the intercultural and socio-political ones which can only be achieved through a variety of languages in multicultural contexts.”

To take a different example, but still remaining in the field of extrasituational
(educational) context classification, R. Taylor (1996) speaks of BANA (British – including the Republic of Ireland, Australian, North American countries), A. Holliday (1994) of TESEP (tertiary, secondary, primary) ELT methods where English is learnt as either an arterial or a second/foreign language, respectively while D. Crystal (1997) of the inner circle (where English is used as a mother tongue), the outer circle (where English is used as a second language) and the expanding circle (where English is used as a foreign language).

Obviously, the overall language course delivery (whatever the setting is) depends on which angle of sociocultural, historical, political, educational, economic, technological, linguistic and/or geographic perspective is paid more attention to. Along similar lines, and not without any meaning, are environmental conditions that can influence (that is either enhance or delay) one’s target language development. R. Ellis (1988) recognizes the significance of eight such conditions and they all relate to pedagogical settings: a) the quantity of intake, b) a need to communicate (CALP: Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency or BICS: Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills; the first stands for the ability to make use of language in order to learn and discuss abstract ideas), c) independent control of the propositional content, d) adherence to the here and now principle, e) the performance of a range of speech acts, f) an input rich in directives, g) an input rich in extending utterances, and h) uninhibited practice.

The present chapter looks at the contexts and environments in which the English language can be taught and learnt but for globalisation and the rapid expansion of information technologies, there is a greater diversification noticeable in both contexts and situations in which it is learnt and used, and not to mention the changing nature of the language itself (R. Carter/ D. Nunan 2006). What is more, the distinction between English as a first language (L1) and English as a second language (L2) can now be questioned with the English language detaching itself from its historical roots. In actual fact, it is possible to question the term English and use the term world Englishes instead – on a similar note, one can speak of the native versus non-native speaker varieties of English, too (R. Carter/ D. Nunan 2006).

The foregoing analysis has begun with the language classroom as the most obvious and immediate physical context where any language lesson takes place but teaching material instructions are also treated as the context of communicative exchanges (A. Niżegorodciew 2007). As is any language lesson, S. Walsh (2006: 16), taking a slightly different approach, suggests and which

[c]an be viewed as a dynamic and complex series of interrelated contexts, in which interaction is central to teaching and learning. Rather than seeing the classroom as a single social context, as is so often the case, the view taken here is that participants in classroom discourse, teachers and learners, co-construct (plural) contexts. Contexts are constructed through the talk-in-interaction in relation to specific institutional goals and the unfolding pedagogic goals of a lesson.

In my analysis on classroom discourse, I shall now move beyond the area of context and concentrate more on the inner processes taking place within it. One area in need of particular attention in this respect is that of interaction.
3.2. Interaction in the language classroom

All the approaches to classroom discourse are preoccupied, to a certain extent, with interaction analysis:

- the structural approach deals with classroom talk (teacher talk, learner talk and silence/confusion),
- the interactionist approach is more concerned with the nature of interaction in naturalistic settings in which the non-native speaker is exposed to the target language in social or professional contexts (foreigner-talk or naturalistic learners and native-speaker communication),
- the strategic approach highlights the learner’s competence when coping with communication difficulties (risk-avoiding, risk-taking and interactive strategies),
- the methodological approach addresses the instances of classroom management discourse (L1 role, teacher typology and learner questions, classroom dynamics, socio-emotional atmosphere or observation),
- the reflective approach, also known as classroom research, investigates in-service language teacher training and language teacher development (self-observation, experience and reflection role),
- the psycholinguistic approach examines effects that pedagogic discourse has on learning (Krashen’s second-language acquisition theory findings analysed in light of Swain’s comprehensible output hypothesis, and vice versa)
- the sociolinguistic approach argues whether pedagogic discourse can be perceived as a specific discourse in and of itself.

On a similar note, S. C. Levinson (1983) suggests that discourse analysis and conversation analysis are two major approaches to the study of naturally occurring interaction.

Drawing on A. A. Bellack’s et al. (1966) three part exchange (soliciting, responding and reacting, or, as it is now more commonly described: initiation, response, feedback), J. Majer (2003) recalls that interaction in the language classroom is viewed as a sequence of moves (categories of structuring, soliciting, responding or reacting) addressed in accordance with a particular situation. Those index categories of pedagogical purpose together with source, medium, use and content are distinguished by J. F. Fanselow (1977) the author of a research methodology named FOCUS: foci for observing communications used in settings (J. Majer 2003). J. F. Fanselow (1977) draws on A. A. Bellack’s (1966) pattern of structure (that is solicit, respond and react) as the categories of classroom interaction.

But, it needs to be made clear, it is J. Sinclair/ M. Coulthard (1975) who, following the exchange structure approach (like the Birmingham School of Discourse Analysis), in their model of classroom interaction, first speak of five distinct ranks that handle it: lesson, transaction, exchange, move and act; by doing so, they build on J. L. Austin's (1962) and J. R. Searle’s (1969) speech act categories. J. Sinclair/ M. Coulthard (1975) find that there are three basic moves
(and they themselves consist of one or more acts). The first move in each exchange then is called an opening move, the second an answering move while the third a follow-up move although J. Sinclair/ D. Brazil (1982), in contrast, prefer to talk of initiation, response and follow-up.

According to the findings of J. Sinclair/ M. Coulthard (1975), and regarding the rigid pattern in the language of traditional native-speaker school classrooms, the act “defined principally by their interactive function”, M. Coulthard (1985: 126) writes, is the lowest rank, the exchange is a series or chain of moves in any interaction, the transaction is, in turn, made up of exchanges while the lesson, as the highest rank, consists of combinations of transactions. And as for transactions, M. Coulthard (1985: 124) adds, these

> have a structure expressed in terms of exchanges – they begin and often end with a boundary exchange, which consists of a frame and/or focus, followed by a succession of informing, directing, or eliciting exchanges. Informing, directing and eliciting exchanges are concerned with what is more commonly known as ‘stating’, ‘commanding’ and ‘questioning’ behaviour, though these terms are not used (...).

J. Sinclair/ M. Coulthard (1975) follow the exchange structure approach but, as J. Cutting (2008: 22) notices, there are, in actual fact, “two approaches to looking at the structure of discourse. One analyses the exchange structure or the conventional overall patterns that occur when people are talking. The other is conversation analysis, studying the way that what speakers say dictates the type of answer expected, and that speakers take turns when they interact.”

As we have been able to see, W. M. Rivers’ (1987) definition makes reciprocity an indispensable requirement for any interaction to occur – and, indeed, “learning arises not through interaction, but in interaction”, R. Ellis (2000: 209) admits. R. Allwright (1984: 159) calls it “by definition and in practice” a co-production, P. Riley (1985: 338) uses the term collaborative construct “of two or more participants whose contributions or turns combine to form interactive structure in terms of who speaks when and to whom” and C. B. Cazden (1988: 44) supports this viewpoint alike by comparing lessons to social events “produced by the collaborative work of all the parties involved”.

But does all the teaching profession unilaterally perceive classroom interaction in a similar vein to W. M. Rivers (1987), R. Allwright (1984), P. Riley (1985) or C. B. Cazden (1988) – that is as if it was, in an equalised manner, in the hands of both the parties concerned?

S. Walsh (2006: 47) reports that interaction propagates reflection and, to give yet one more example, admits that “today, there is far more learner-initiated communication, more equal turn-taking and less reliance on teacher-fronted and lockstep modes of learning” than in the 1960s. Linking pedagogy and interaction through talk, S. Walsh (2006: 62) enumerates four types of such L2 classroom modes (a typical feature of which are interactures but excluding deviant cases like mode switching, mode side sequences and mode divergence) that, in turn, encompass “the interrelatedness of language use and teaching purpose”:
1) managerial – their principal pedagogic purpose is the management of learning, including setting up a task, summarizing or providing feedback on one particular stage of a lesson, 2) materials – patterns of interaction evolving from the material that largely determines who may speak, when and what they may say, 3) skills and systems – pedagogic goals closely related to providing language practice in relation to a particular language system such as phonology, grammar, vocabulary, discourse or language skill such as reading, listening, writing, speaking, and 4) classroom context – responsible for maintaining genuine communication rather than displaying linguistic knowledge, interactional space-centred (S. Walsh 2006: 69-82).

According to S. Walsh (2001), there are many factors such as the roles of teachers and learners, their expectations and goals, the relationship between language use and teaching methodology or the interplay between teachers and language learners that contribute to the production of conductive (and effective) learning interaction, which he terms classroom interactional competence (CIC). On top of that (and getting to the main point), S. Walsh (2006: 21) is also of the opinion that both teachers and learners need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the interactive processes that facilitate learning. Interaction does not simply happen, nor is it a function of the teaching methodology; interaction, in an acquisition rich classroom, is both instigated and sustained by the teacher. While learners clearly have a significant role to play, it is the teacher who has prime responsibility.

Classroom discourse (formalised and predetermined in nature), to be quite blunt, is obviously not a method for language teaching but aims merely to describe and understand the way language is used and experienced (M. McCarthy 2007). M. McTear (1975) reports that L2 classroom discourse may have, so called, pseudo-communicative intentions while R. Ellis (1988), on the other hand, calls those instances of formalised and predetermined language type modelled data. It can be perceived as authentic communication (as in the case of naturalistic discourse, i.e. outside the pedagogic environment), unstructured and unpredictable or termed communicative data (R. Ellis 1988) where participants share equal discourse rights when involved in activity-oriented interactions (J. Majer 2003).

But, it might be the case, that L2 classroom discourse is managed only by the teacher with free conversational participation (the aim of which is to help facilitate the achievement of pedagogical goals, and for both high- and low-input generators alike) being restricted (T. Pica 1987).

Talking of natural and pedagogic L2 discourse, it is worth paying attention to J. Majer's presentation (2003) of his fundamental differences (table 3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Naturalistic L2 discourse</th>
<th>Pedagogic L2 discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>non-instructional</td>
<td>instructional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>social interaction</td>
<td>class management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>meaning</td>
<td>form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>authentic</td>
<td>pre-planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>communicative</td>
<td>pseudo-communicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>non-hierarchical</td>
<td>hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style/Register</td>
<td>informal</td>
<td>formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power relations</td>
<td>equalised</td>
<td>unequal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>two-way</td>
<td>one-way (T-Ss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learner role</td>
<td>speaker</td>
<td>talker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk</td>
<td>symmetrical</td>
<td>asymmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern</td>
<td>information exchange</td>
<td>IRF/display questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input</td>
<td>foreigner talk</td>
<td>teacher talk/peer talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metatalk</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>frequently used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output opportunities</td>
<td>ample</td>
<td>limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switching to L1</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation of meaning</td>
<td>frequent</td>
<td>rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>repair</td>
<td>error correction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: J. Majer's (2003: 220) fundamental differences between naturalistic and pedagogic L2 discourse

As we can see, the basic unit of pedagogic discourse is the aforementioned three-phase interactional pattern known under the name Initiation-Response-Feedback/Follow-up (H. Mehan 1974) or IRF – after the initials of the triad sequence. It clearly copies the second of the two assumptions although E. Hatch (2001: 93) admits that:

[t]here are a variety of ways in which classroom activities may be organized, but four are typical of elementary classrooms. The most common is the teacher interacting with all the students as a class. The teacher determines whether his or her talk will be to all the students or to individuals. The teacher may elicit individual or chorus responses, and may allow students to volunteer or call on them. The second most frequent type of interaction is for the teacher to meet with some students as a group (as in reading or writing groups). In this context, the students must respond individually since the teacher’s purpose is often to evaluate individual performance. The third type of activity is for students to work independently at their desks with the teacher available for help. Students must approach the teacher or raise a hand to obtain this help, and the interaction is not heard by the other students. The fourth type of interaction consists of group work that students themselves run with little supervision from the teacher.

There is also non-educational discourse that follows a five-part sequence of opening, notice and phatic talk, the request, thanking and closing. Some researches like C. B. Cazden (1988) or K. E. Johnson (1995), talking again about the IRF
paradigm, choose evaluation as its very last component but even then, the two roles of the F-move of the index triad are evaluative and discoursal, R. Cullen (2002) claims. At times, we may also find a combination of IRF(R) or (P)IRF (where P stands for the Precursor) or the example of a mere IR dyadic. From the point of view of H. Bishop (2008: 66):

...although classroom discourse researchers have suggested that teachers withhold third-turn feedback moves in order to encourage peer evaluation of student questions or responses, in this case, the third-turn teacher feedback is only a preface to another teacher action, that of asking another student to give an answer to a peer question.

The IRF/IRE approach to the exchange of information is basically a tool of teacher-led instruction (or recitation) discouraging any student initiation and repair work (Ch. A. Curran 2008) in which, as K. E. Johnson (1995: 108) admits “who talks, when and about what are controlled by the teacher”. And it is the teacher who always initiates these teaching cycles as they are originally called so by A. A. Bellack et al. (1966), and the student’s role is restricted to giving a reply with the index pattern of discussion ending with feedback or evaluation (in either verbal or non-verbal form), or both.

This unequal distribution of power (teachers filling in two of the three slots) makes it incompatible with the findings of communicative language teaching methodology as discourse rights (such as, for instance, initiating and closing exchanges, determining their length, including and excluding participants as well as deciding on the number and order of their turns) are granted to teachers but not learners. As a consequence, that particular discourse sample (the IRF paradigm) becomes monopolised by pedagogues. One explanation of the fact that the teacher fills in the third slot too, M. Coulthard (1985: 135) posits, is that “the teacher is not seeking information in the accepted sense, as he already knows the answer, but it is essential for the pupils to know whether their answer is the one the teacher was looking for, and hence there is a situational necessity for the follow-up move”.

Despite the fact that, as it has just been said, the model in question reflects the traditional teacher-centred classroom, “[i]t does not accommodate easily to the real-life pressures and unruliness of the classroom, such as a pupil not responding to the teacher but asking a friend to respond, or a pupil returning the question with another question” either, J. Cutting (2008: 25) writes. Having said that, she (2008: 25) also makes it clear that “[a]lthough the structure of classroom transactions is not typical of everyday talk, it is typical of transactions of a formal and ritualistic nature with one person in a position of power over the other(s), controlling the discourse and planning it to a certain extent: interviews and trials are examples”.

Talking of strictly classroom environment, however, it is possible for teachers to plan what and how to teach and the outer and inner discourse structures (both terms coined by J. Sinclair/D. Brazil 1982), can be of some help in that respect, too; as R. Ellis (1999: 213) says:

[O]uter language consists of utterances which provide a framework for the lesson, enabling pedagogic activities to take place. Such utterances are
produced by both the teacher and the students. Inner language consists of those utterances produced during the course of a pedagogic activity; it is comprised of the samples of language designated as the goal of the activity.

But, let me repeat once again, classroom interaction per se is not planned but, rather, co-produced with the learners (R. Ellis 1994). And unspoken classroom rules, R. Ellis (1988: 106) writes, are not always observed – even within the IRF cycle: a teacher-student exchange that is typically reduced to the transaction itself, and which takes place “when the teacher deviates from the main goal to deal with some issue that has cropped up. (...) the teacher’s input occurs as a response to something the pupils have said rather than as a pre-planned teacher-initiated exchange.”

Before I conclude this part, I would yet like to mention L. Li (2011: 155) who conducts her research in order to “illustrate features of classroom interaction in EFL classrooms where teachers facilitate or obstruct opportunities to develop learners’ thinking skills”.

The data for it come from a data pool consisting of 18 video-recorded EFL lessons of both lower secondary and upper secondary Chinese students, with their English levels ranging from lower intermediate to upper-intermediate. The data are gathered during 2005-2009 for the purpose of some larger research project (all participating schools are state schools from 4 different local education authorities), and its aim, as L. Li (2011: 149) puts it, is “to improve teachers’ understanding of the nature of classroom, their roles in developing autonomous [sic] learners and promoting meaning co-construction in language classrooms.” L. Li's (2011: 155) findings are of tripartite character and suggest that:

- language classrooms are complex social and discourse communities, where teachers can create, develop, manage and navigate space for developing thinking skills through classroom interaction,
- it is the teacher who manages the turn-taking and -giving in such classroom discourse and how teachers manage turns is closely associated with pedagogical goals,
- thinking activities can be identified by examining the role of language in classroom activities.

Indeed, according to L. Li (2011: 146), “[a] sociocultural analysis of language use and interaction patterns in EFL classrooms suggests how teachers facilitate or obstruct learner participation, negotiation and meaning co-construction, in selected classroom episodes.” In the further part of the foregoing chapter, I shall focus on the issue of how teachers facilitate their learners’ participation by providing examples of different questioning practices.

In fact, I shall turn the readers’ attention towards the issue of teacher (and also learner) talk, perceived as an element of discourse rather than input (J. Majer 2003). This is subsequently seen through the lens of the role of, already introduced here, feedback and, secondly, power distribution in EFL language classroom (the use of questions, requests and commands). But, before I proceed to do that, I would like to finish this part by pointing out the four arguments propagated by D. Musumeci (1996) as a counterbalance to the aforementioned viewpoints. She, namely, believes
that: a) question and answer routines are appropriate classroom behaviour, b) teachers, through their feedback, try to make the learners feel good, c) asymmetrical roles grant the teacher more of the floor in the teacher-students power relations and, last but by no means least, d) question and answer routines seem to be most effective in any time-constrained class.

3.2.1. Teacher and learner talk

It is not surprising that it is the teacher who fills most of the lesson time with their form-and-accuracy centred talk: teacherese (L. Van Lier 1996); as opposed to peer/learner or interlanguage talk (S. D. Krashen 1981). Said that, one can also deal either with the non-native EFL teacher’s TEFLe (D. Willis 1990) or the native-speaker teacher’s TESLe (P. B. Patil 1994). Such talk, if reciprocal (that is between both the teacher and students alike) leads to the formation of classroom transactions – we cannot speak of classroom conversations though for talk, G. Cook (1989: 51) admits, may only be classed as conversation when: a) it is not primarily necessitated by a practical task, b) any unequal power of participants is partially suspended, c) the number of the participants is small, d) turns are quite short, and e) talk is primarily for the participants not for an outside audience.

Most often than not, talk is also deprived of so called performance phenomena (conversational tools needed to respond naturally under such conditions as fatigue, inattention, distraction, excitement or anxiety) or becomes trivialised (i.e. referring to situations in which exchanges are linguistically efficient but not fully functional situationally).

Any learner, L. Van Lier (1984) states, can also be an initiator of predominantly dyadic (as far as the address system is concerned where: S = Speaker, A = Addressee, H = Hearer, O = Overhearer; Speaker rather than Talker has the right to initiate and close a discourse unit) classroom discourse, the examples of which L. Van Lier (1984) lists under four types of activity in a language classroom. These are: a) general phatic conversation, small talk, warm-up (where learners can talk about anything they want), b) announcement, explanation, instruction, lecture (where some information be exchanged), c) interview, joke, discussion, debate, report, summary, elicitation (where some information be exchanged in such-and-such a way), and d) repetition drill, substitution drill, pair work, role play, game (where such-and-such must be said following specific rules).

The purpose of teacherese, however, is, among other things, to provide students with comprehensible input, provide students with feedback, generate a repair, ask a question and then immediately react to the learner’s response, manage the class (but also the teaching and learning process), allocate turns (teachers, granted unlimited participation rights, have the authority indeed to nominate particular learners), etc.

R. Ellis (1984), to give an example, differentiates between three goals of L2 classroom discourse, to which he includes: 1) core goals, relating to the explicit purpose of teaching such as for instance modelling, correcting, eliciting student's
self-correction, 2) framework goals, relating to the general organizational management of lessons such as e.g. giving instructions to elicit desired actions, introduction of new topics and activities, and 3) social goals, relating to more personal purposes such as for example disciplining, management, small talk or praising particular students.

In fact, it is the teacher who, depending on the environment, in his/her model of slow formal speech (although the choice of genre, purpose, context and code are vital, too) has to communicate ideas, involve learners (through nominations or directives), elicit, and evaluate alike. As K. E. Johnson (1995: 90) puts it: “the teacher plays a critical role in understanding, establishing and maintaining patterns of communication that will foster, to the greatest extent, both classroom learning and second language acquisition.”

Moreover, it is also the teacher, or, rather, teacherese that is responsible for providing students with raw (primary) linguistic data or positive input (which has a real communicative purpose) as well as serves as an L2 model. Following A. Niżegorodcew (2007: 143), this is defined as “the language the learners hear in the naturalistic environment”. In contrast, corrective (secondary) linguistic data or negative input, the authoress (2007: 143) continues, constitutes

[t]he language that the learners hear in the instructional environment, and which is specially focused on those features of the learners’ interlanguage they are not able to correct by themselves on the basis of raw (primary) linguistic data, since they do not receive enough information about those features in it. Secondary linguistic data (...) are necessary to enable the learners to acquire native-like L2.

L. Van Lier (1996) presents five sub-types of the content of teacher talk to which he includes: experiential (familiar topics and learner experiences), here-and-now (concrete, everyday and current topics), simplified (involving reduced vocabulary and simpler grammar), amplified (involving increased examples and visual backup) and scaffolded (involving support structures and handover).

Metacommunication – that is talking about communicating (it should not be confused with C. Faerch’s concept of metatalk, 1985 – that is talk about the linguistic code and the content of teaching) reinforces the teacher’s control over classroom talk. L. Van Lier (1988) consequently subdivides it further into three distinct categories: metalinguistical (corrections, explanations), metadiscoursal (confirmations, clarification requests, recapitulations) and metapragmatical (attention getting, control of speech).

Language choice itself, during either real or simulated L2 classroom communicative use, is determined by both pedagogical and sociolinguistic need to overcome some communication difficulty (but also compensatory or strategic uses alike), and is strictly connected with the context in which the English language be taught and learnt: a) monoglossic (predominantly L1), b) heteroglossic (predominantly L2), c) diglossic (variations in different social contexts in speech of the same speakers) or d) mixed (typical of communication between a non-native teacher and a homogenous, monolingual class).
Native talk is preferred when, for instance, giving instructions, managing a class, assigning homework, announcing tests, providing explanations, being involved in real communicative situations, providing corrective feedback, providing encouragement, providing evaluation, providing teachers’ asides, talking to the youngest learners or controlling discipline in the classroom (H. Majer/ J. Majer 1995; J. Majer 2003).

There is no empirical evidence indicating that minimising L1 use necessarily leads to higher learning efficiency with the compromise position being that EFL teachers should use L2 as often as possible (so as not to turn a L2 classroom into a content classroom where L2 is, as a result, only a subject matter) whereas learners should be allowed to use L1 if they cannot manage interaction in L2 (H. Majer/ J. Majer 1995; J. Majer 2003). Said that, it is native target language speaker teacher, an expert in both L2 linguistic and cultural knowledge with near-native competence in the L1 of their learners that is most desired in L2 teaching context, A. Niżegorodcew (2007) indicates.

Throughout the lesson, students can talk in both their L1 and L2 although, according to A. Niżegorodcew (2007) the target language communication is preferred but for affective or instructional circumstances. Students, as H. Majer/ J. Majer (1995), and J. Majer (2003) say, are also free to make use of: a) alternated talk (employing L2 and L1 interchangeably), b) concurrent talk (providing a translation of complete utterances while alternating the languages; this term, based on the concept of concurrent translation, is extensively criticised by S. D. Krashen 1985), c) switched talk (known as mixed talk means shifting from one language to the other. It stays in opposition to code-switching which is the use of two or more languages in one speech exchange by either bilingual or multilingual speakers), d) parallel talk (termed by S. D. Krashen 1985, parallel codes: teaching by using L2 only. The learners, on the other hand, can express themselves in either language), e) glossed talk (eliciting glosses in the other language with excessive use of translation) or f) metalinguistic talk (known as grammatical commentary: clarifying grammar terminology both in L2 and L1).

M. Olpińska-Szkielko (2013a) presents arguments in favour of bilingual education and the final conclusion that she reaches (2013a: 147) is that “bilingual programmes constitute a very good alternative to traditional forms of foreign language learning”. In her other work, M. Olpińska-Szkielko (2013b) proves that early contact with language other than one’s mother tongue can positively affect the child’s linguistic, cognitive, emotional and social development (provided that certain conditions are met). In the first year of bilingual education, oral skills ought to be developed (listening comprehension and speaking, that is imitating pronunciation, rhythm and intonation); in the next year – it is reading that should be focused on; and, finally, in the third year – writing (M. Olpińska-Szkielko 2013b). Taking into consideration bilingual programmes sociolinguistic context, prestige, role, language(s) value in the community or teaching aim, M. Olpińska-Szkielko (2013b: 88) refers to the following three types of bilingual education models: a) enrichment
bilingual education, b) transitional bilingual education and c) maintenance bilingual education.

Finally, M. Olpińska-Szkielek (2013b), drawing in her definition of bilingualism on the findings of N. Denison (1984) or T. T. Skutnabb-Kangas (1987), makes a reference to the concept of semilingualism (understood as distractive bilingualism or a period of double semilingualism); the index term has been introduced by N. Hånsegard (1968).

Extending beyond the traditional associations with standard teacher talk, I feel it right to mention, marked by personality and conversational style, instructional idiolect construct now. S. Walsh (2006: 138-9), pondering on it, says that it is “made up of a range of features, but is essentially built upon an individual’s personal, conversational style, speech habits which are ‘carried over’ into an individual’s role as a teacher; speech habits which may be conductive or detrimental to the creation of learning opportunities”.

Its L2 classroom version, more controlled in its nature, is known as instructional conversations. But whether instructional or naturalistic, speaking, typically reciprocal (that is any interlocutors are normally able to contribute simultaneously to their discourse, and respond immediately to one another’s contributions) and always produced and processed “on line” (G. Cook 1989) – i.e. under time pressure, can be considered, as M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007: 165) admit:

> [t]he most difficult skill to acquire since it requires command of both listening comprehension and speech production subskills (e.g., vocabulary retrieval, pronunciation, choice of a grammatical pattern, and so forth) in unpredictable, unplanned situations. On the other hand, speaking can be viewed as the easiest skill since one can use body language, demonstration, repetition, and various other strategies to make oneself understood.

### 3.2.2. The role of feedback and repair

It is the task of language teachers to provide their students with feedback (be it linguistic or performance) in order to reinforce well-formed structures and correct (and, thus, prevent) ill-formed ones. The latter can include errors of competence (like malapropisms) or mistakes of performance (such as spelling, wrong tense usage, concord – the agreement between subject and verb, wrong word order, inappropriate language, punctuation, a word missing or unclear meaning, just to name a few).

This compulsory element of classroom communication, as J. Sinclair/ M. Coulthard (1975) call it, has the form of interruptions (rather than overlaps) if initiated by the teacher, but it can equally well be negotiated and supplied by students alike, especially during pair- or group-work activities – as a consequence, it is attended to and learnt from by others in the class.

Error/mistake correction and/or feedback can be provided with the help of, for instance: echoing, clarification, repetition, back-channelling (non-verbal signals, verbal tokens and verbal signals), back-shadowing (sentence completions at
potential turn transition points), recasts (reformulation and outright correction by changing one or more sentence components considered, as a matter of fact, impolite in naturalistic discourse), reframing (using different words or phrases) or metalinguistic clues.

Mistakes (or errors), M. Bartram/ R. Walton (1991: 19) claim, are not deliberate for “[l]anguage learners are involved in an elaborate process: sometimes the language they produce reflects the point they have reached, but often it does not. Rather than criticise the product, it may be the teacher’s job to aid the process. After all, students do not usually make mistakes deliberately”.

What is more, with the gradual acceptance of errors as productive and developmental rather than frowned upon and, consequently, considered substandard and deviant, grammatical accuracy has become secondary to communication (J. Reid 2006). But once interactional barriers between teacher and his/her students are created, it is feedback that denotes the extent to which some message is comprehended in the process of any interaction (and, indeed, feedback does belong to the area of interaction).

In the very next subchapter I shall focus on questions as it is with their help that immediate feedback be gained. All in all, in naturalistic discourse, feedback can be supplied by native speakers although, E. Shohamy (in M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain 2007: 209) states:

[c]urrent debates question whether the native speaker should be considered as a criterion for appropriate language use given that there are many variations in discourse even among native speakers representing different varieties and dialects. Since English is the world’s current lingua franca, this makes it more difficult to determine what ‘correct’ English is.

Feedback, then, can be corrective in the form of explicit advice (all error correction is, in fact, feedback), strategic and given usually in students’ mother tongue, cognitive or affective – both ranging from positive to neutral to negative but also covert or overt. The latter, quite discouraging in its form, can easily be replaced with confirmation checks or clarification requests as can outright corrective feedback as a whole. Indeed, it often happens that communication problems, both unintended forms and misunderstandings, are diagnosed and cured by EFL interactants themselves whatever the (pedagogic) context, distinguished by P. Seedhouse (1999) is: form and accuracy, classroom as a speech community, task-oriented or real-world target speech community.

The learner’s response to feedback, called uptake, leads, most often, to student-generated repairs for which E. Hatch (1983) uses the name reruns. S. Walsh (2006: 10), for instance, believes that “[w]hile repair between native and non-native adults outside the classroom might be deemed inappropriate, since it would result in a loss of face, there is absolutely no reason why errors should not be corrected in the L2 formal context.” When it comes to overall repair classification, four types are distinguished and these are: self-initiated self-repair, self-initiated other-repair, other-initiated self-repair and other-initiated other-repair (the only choice being, to put it in simple terms, between self- and other-initiation of repair).
 Needless to say, it is most beneficial (for the L2 speaker-learner) if the first type occurs (typically in content- rather than language-centred lessons), which L. Van Lier (1984: 167) illustrates in the following words:

[a] speaking problem which the speaker deals with is not an error. However, a speaking problem which is dealt with by ‘other-initiation’ or ‘other-correction’ attains the status of ‘error’. In many activities in L2 classrooms, correction occurs massively as a matter of routine, and such activities are thus error-creating. They turn problems of speaking into ‘errors’. In addition, these activities may create in the learner a reliance upon other-repair, thus preventing the development of self-initiated repair, which is characteristic of competent L1 conversation.

3.2.3. The importance of questions

Let me have a look now at another, equally important aspect of teacher talk: questions. As we have been able to see, the importance of questions is yet realised in the second decade of the 20th century with the emergence of the Natural and the Direct Method. With the time going by their importance has been developed even further although, generally speaking, questions (lower- or fact rather than higher- or reason) are blamed indeed for not stimulating students’ critical or cognitive thinking abilities such as hypothesising, analysing, synthesising or generalising. Questions can perform a number of different roles from gaining immediate feedback, eliciting particular structures (such is also the role of Socratic dialogue), providing a language model, encouraging student participation, checking or testing comprehension, giving students practice and output opportunities (a characteristic feature indeed of what W. Hüllen/ W. Lörcher 1989, call repetitive classroom discourse) or just making sure that everyone gets a chance to answer.

T. Lynch maintains (1996: 108) that questioning patterns – referential i.e. real, genuine ones (T. Lynch 1996) rather than display patterns i.e. known-answer questions (C. B. Cazden 1988), known information questions (H. Mehan 1979), pseudo-questions (E. Hatch/ M. Long 1980) or pedagogic questions (T. Lynch 1996), specifically, “have been shown to be a means by which teachers exert control over the interaction, and not simply a means of eliciting information”, and are, therefore, preferred in communicative language teaching.

E. Hatch/ M. Long (1980), although making no distinction between content area instruction and second or foreign language teaching (in the two latter, questions serve an additional role of practice), distinguish between four types of teacher questioning routines: 1) factual (i.e. What-questions), 2) reasoning (i.e. How- and Why-questions), 3) open (i.e. not requiring reasoning, accepting a whole range of potential answers) and 4) social (i.e. control Won’t you-questions and appeal Aren’t we-questions).

To take a different example, H. D. Brown (1994), in his typology of teacher questions, differentiates between procedural (helping the teacher to organise a class),
divergent and convergent questions (the last two types are the opposite of each other serving the purpose of helping students with learning). R. Peterson’s (1992) and M. Nathan’s (1995) studies, in turn, put questions into two basic categories: closed and open – not on the basis of their structure (i.e. yes/no versus wh-) but the quantity of output (the latter type requires more elaborate answers indeed). Both closed and open questions are further divided into directed (aimed at a particular student) and undirected (general address), too.

As per the questioning strategies, their typology is grounded on the purposes for which questions are asked and, thus, H. D. Brown (1994) speaks of: knowledge (providing factual answers), comprehension (interpreting), application (known information applied to new situations), inference (forming conclusions), analysis (in parts), synthetic (combining elements into a new pattern) and evaluation questions (making judgements). But questions can well involve applying facts, recalling facts, interpreting results, applying reasoning, designing procedures and hypothesising or predicting.

Whatever the question type, and bearing in mind that different types of questions demand different skills, the speaker only has a standard silence of approximately one second (wait time can be extended though in the case of beginner or elementary learners) to: a) formulate his/her answer (cognitive pause), b) let the interlocutor take the floor (interactive pause; right to the floor can also be secured with the help of parataxis such as and or uh and hypotaxis such as because) or c) provide feedback without taking the floor or d) cough or sneeze (physiological pause). At times, an alternative to silence – so called filled pauses, i.e. “verbalised hesitations without semantic significance” as M. B. Wesche/ D. Ready (1985: 93) put it (for example, uh, uhm, or fillers), can be used.

Apart from questions, both teachers and students can perform a number of requests such as (S. Blum-Kulka et al. 1989):
- the use of mood derivable utterances (e.g. repeat, please),
- hedged performatives preceded with a hedge (e.g. I’d like to ask you to),
- query preparatory (e.g. would you mind),
- deontic modals (e.g. have to),
- alerters (honorific attention getting devices e.g. excuse me, Miss/Sir),
- suggestory formulas (e.g. how about),
- downgraders (e.g. I wonder if or do you think..?),
- want statements (students, in their appeals for assistance, authority or verification, make frequent use of extended justifications and explanations and, generally, over-rely on e.g. please).

3.2.4. The choice of syllabus and curriculum

In the last two subchapters, attention has been paid to the role of feedback/repair, and then questions and requests as part of any teacher/learner talk. Equally important as the aforementioned structures, as pointed out at the very beginning of this work –
when talking about the application of a particular set of core of teaching and learning principles, is the choice of syllabus and curriculum, too.

Indeed, school curriculum is the first reason for learning foreign languages (J. Harmer 1995) followed by (the list, Harmer confirms, is not exhaustive): advancement, target language community, English for Specific Purposes, culture and miscellaneous (that is all the others). And E. Hinkel (2006: 111) adds to that as for teaching the skill of speaking/listening/reading/writing, modern curricula “strive to achieve a balance between the linguistic and the schematic aspects of learner language development.”

M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshatin (2007: 185), drawing on F. Dubin/ E. Olshtain’s (1986) definition, recall the social context of learning and the importance of language use as far as discourse-based approach towards curriculum design is taken into consideration, and report that:

[a] curriculum is a document of an official nature, published by a leading or central educational authority in order to serve as a framework or a set of guidelines for the teaching of a subject area – in our case a language – in a broad and varied context. Thus, a state at the national level, a board of education at the district level, a community at the municipal level or a university or college at the local academic level may choose to issue a document stating the scope and goals of its program for teaching a second or foreign language [while] [a] syllabus, in contrast to the curriculum, is a more particularized document that addresses a specific audience of learners and teachers, a particular course of study or a particular series of textbooks. Ideally, in this sense, a curriculum should be implemented through a variety of syllabuses and each of these syllabuses should be compatible with the overall curriculum.

Talking of curriculum, M. Celce-Murcia/ E. Olshtain (2007) distinguish between: a) content-based (focused on content – whether linguistic, thematic or situational and subject-matter perspective of the course), b) process-based (focused, irrespective of whether one speaks of task-based/needs-based/learner-based curriculum, on the process of language learning and language teaching), c) learner-based (focused on the learner and their needs), d) product-based (focused on the outcomes of the course of study) or e) discourse-based (focused on the findings of research done in applied linguistics, second language acquisition, curriculum development or sociolinguistics).

A syllabus (drawing on M. P. Breen 2006), on the other hand, by providing a clear framework of knowledge and capabilities, can be: a) formal (focused on how linguists describe language), b) functional (focused on particular purposes of language and how these would be expressed linguistically), c) task-based (focused either on communicative or target-like tasks or metacommunicative or learning tasks, sometimes also called pedagogic tasks – whether formally or functionally identified), d) lexical (focused on lexis or vocabulary), e) outcomes-based (focused on outcomes or competencies) or f) process (focused on contents and ways of working).
M. P. Breen's (in R. Carter/ D. Nunan 2006) four syllabus types (formal, functional, task-based and process) are included in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge Focus</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Task-based</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Focus</td>
<td>Forms, systems and rules of phonology, morphology, vocabulary, grammar, discourse as text.</td>
<td>Purposes of language use in terms of social functions: e.g. requests, descriptions, explanations, etc.</td>
<td>Meanings derived and created through unified system of linguistic forms and interpersonal conventions.</td>
<td>Overall same as task-based but focus may also narrow at times to Formal/Functional knowledge depending upon identified immediate and long terms needs of learners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Capabilities Focus | Accurate production. 4 skills from receptive to productive. | Social appropriateness based on repertoire of functions. 4 skills related to purposes/needs. | Comprehensible, accurate and appropriate interpretation, expression and negotiation of meanings in tasks. Skills use integrated within tasks. | Same as task-based plus negotiated decision-making within classroom group on aspects of the class curriculum. |

| Selection and subdivision | Larger units down to smaller units: e.g. sentence types or intonation patterns to modality, inflections, particular vocabulary, single sounds, etc. | Linguistic realisations of superordinate functions of language in common use or derived from Needs Analysis for particular Special Purposes; academic or occupational. | Communicative/target-like tasks: everyday tasks (e.g. planning a trip) or special purpose tasks (e.g. solving technical problem). Metacommunicative/learning tasks: e.g. deducing pattern in verb forms or comparing learning strategies. | Negotiation cycle: 1. Decisions made on purposes, content, and ways of working in classroom group; 2. Agreed action – such as tasks/activities; 3. Evaluation of both outcomes and chosen procedures. Cycle applied to all elements in the curriculum so that actual syllabus of the class evolves. |
Table 4: M. P. Breen's (2006: 155) key characteristics of the four main syllabus types

| Sequencing | Assumes learner accumulates and synthesises. Simple to complex, or frequent to infrequent, or most useful to less useful. | Assumes learner builds repertoire. Most common linguistic realisations to more subtle or most needed to less needed. | Assumes learner refines knowledge and abilities in cyclic way. Familiar to less familiar or generalisable to less generalisable tasks. Task sequence also shaped by problems in earlier tasks. | Assumes learner refines knowledge and abilities in cyclic way. Sequence of activities and tasks emerges in ongoing way through evaluation stage (3) revealing needs and achievements which inform next decisions (1). |

To conclude, the goal of the present chapter, as indicated at the very beginning of it, has been twofold: firstly, I have investigated English teaching and learning contexts so as to, subsequently, be able to dwell on interaction processes taking place in the language classroom (institutionalised, physical environment). Mindful of that way, the very next sub-chapters set out to explore the kind of relationship that can be seen through the lens of both teacher and learner talk (that is teacherese and peer/learner or interlanguage talk, respectively) – in the form of feedback and repair or questions and requests. I have felt it is an indispensable requirement to turn the readers’ focus of attention towards the foundations of syllabus and curriculum as the very last step, too.
4. **Conclusion**

The purpose of this work was to present discourse analysis as the study of the language of communication in the linguistic perspective and, by further investigation of the notion of conversation analysis and speech acts – how they relate to English classroom environment (taught/learnt either as a second or a foreign language). Indeed, as we have seen throughout the analysis, the index work is in line with the key findings of other authors in the field.

Due to the limited scope and, because of the fact that the subject literature is vast (plenty of directly comparable studies), unfortunately, I might not have managed to refer to all the scholars in the field. At times, I might have referred to seminal works in a nutshell only but, irrespective of that, it needs to be stressed, the existing research of the similar nature does produce similar results. It also proves the huge influence that discourse has on our lives.


On Polish grounds, research in this field carried out by such notable scholars as F. Gruca, S. Gruca, M. Olpińska-Szkielko is distinguished.

It would be good to see future research investigating further the impact that discourse has on classroom interaction in, specifically, English as a foreign/second (or additional) language classes in order to see a more in-depth exploration of the overall possibilities of using discourse in classroom contexts and settings. It was not possible to do so in this work as my major goal was to emphasise the linguistic, rather than merely teaching-centred, perspective of discourse-related studies, as, needless to say, the latter is associated with modern foreign languages teaching empirical paradigm.

Talking of classroom discourse – and, in this instance, modern foreign languages teaching and learning, what immediately comes to my mind is the Communicative Approach. It appeared in the second half of the 1970s and the very first propagators of it were Ch. N. Candlin (1976) or H. G. Widdowson (1978, 1979). The Communicative Approach is a cooperative collection of different communicative methodologies which have all found their reflection in the work of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The institutions in question have subsequently worked out common reference goals of language proficiency: the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. What is worth pointing out at this stage is that the Communicative Approach is strictly connected with the discursive method which, in turn, is a glottodidactic conception developed, on Polish grounds, by F. Gruca (1995).

I do hope that I have managed to show how the concept of discourse has changed or, rather, evolved – since its initial use of language longer than a sentence or any process of the use of language to what it is now: a truly interdisciplinary area dealing with the language of communication or, rather, language and communication.
5. References


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